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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON GOVERNMENTS AND FINANCIAL
CRISES IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, 1870-1913
SEPTEMBER 2018
PETER H. BENT
B.A., THE EVERGREEN STATE COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
M.Sc., LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Carol E. Heim
This dissertation studies the factors that contribute to the onset of financial crises
(Chapter 1) and the ways that economies have recovered from crises (Chapters 2 and
3). I am specifically interested in the role that governments played in financial crises
and recoveries. I focus on thirty-five peripheral economies from 1870-1913. Economic
historians refer to this period as the “first era of globalization” for its high degree of in-
ternational capital, trade, and labor movements. This was also an economically volatile
time, with relatively frequent financial crises. Other economic variables, such as com-
modity prices and tariff rates, saw significant fluctuations over this period. The turn of
the twentieth century offers a rich source of data for analyzing the factors that contribute
to the onset of financial crises as well as the recoveries from those crises.
vii
The first chapter studies the role that capital exports from industrial Europe played
in financial crises in peripheral economies from 1880-1913. Capital flows to government-
supported sectors (railways, public utilities, and banks) are found to be strongly associ-
ated with crises in emerging economies at this time, highlighting the role that a negative
feedback loop—between governments facing financial stress and government-supported
industries—played in the onset of crises.
The second chapter addresses the question of what factors drive recoveries after
financial crises. I find that tariff shocks had a positive impact on GDP in post-crisis
periods, while terms of trade shocks had a slightly negative impact. The tariff results are
especially pronounced in temperate countries, which tended to have more advanced and
diversified economies. Overall this suggests that national governments, through trade
policies, played a more significant role in shaping economic outcomes during this period
than is typically recognized.
The third chapter builds on the second chapter by focusing on the cases of the United
States and Argentina in the early 1890s, when both of these countries experienced severe
financial crises. Higher commodity prices played more of a role in encouraging post-crisis
economic growth than did trade policy changes in these countries over this period.
viii
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CHAPTER 1
GOVERNMENT-SUPPORTED INDUSTRIES AND
FINANCIAL CRISES, 1880-1913
1.1 Introduction
Studies of financial crises have increasingly taken a long-run perspective. While the
2007-08 crisis has generated an extensive literature of its own, and the Great Depression
continues to be the focus of much historical economic research, longer-run studies are
offering more comprehensive analyses of the causes and consequences of financial crises.
This chapter builds on that literature, by focusing on financial crises during the globally
integrated decades leading up to the First World War.
Focusing on this turn-of-the-century time frame, Bordo and Meissner (2011) find
an association between capital inflows and financial crises in developing economies. In
contrast, Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2011) and Schularick and Taylor (2012) argue
that credit booms were important factors precipitating crises during this time. Meissner
(2013) brings these two strands of research together into a more comprehensive analysis
and finds that capital flows were more strongly connected with crises than were credit
booms at this time.
This chapter takes this analysis a step further. A newly expanded dataset allows for
a broader analysis of capital exports from industrial Europe, by including data on cap-
ital flows from Germany and France in addition to Britain (Esteves 2007, 2011; Stone,
1999). This dataset also incorporates information on disaggregated capital flows. This
allows for a detailed study of which sectors of capital-importing economies were most
1
associated with financial crises. The evidence suggests that capital flows to government-
supported sectors of developing economies were more strongly connected with financial
crises than were capital flows to the government or the non-government-supported sec-
tors. The historical evidence detailed in the following section supports the interpretation
that capital flows to government-supported sectors resulted in “diabolic loop” scenar-
ios (Brunnermeier et al., 2011). These diabolic loops occurred as government finances
became destabilized in connection with problems in the government-supported sectors.
Previous studies help establish the connections between capital flows and financial
crises. Further insights come from employing disaggregated capital flow data. This
allows us to see if flows to certain sectors of developing economies played more prominent
roles in crises. Bordo and Meissner (2011) implement a similar approach by accounting
for capital flows to railroads, governments, and private sector industries separately in
their analysis. They find that capital flows to railroads were more significantly associated
with crises than were capital flows to the other two sectors. Extensions of this approach
yield deeper insights into the varieties of connections between capital flows and crises
from 1880-1913.
The section below describes the connections between governments in peripheral
economies and these countries’ railway, public utility, and banking industries during
the several decades before the First World War. The data are then described in detail,
before the connections between capital flows and crises are explored empirically. The
conclusion highlights the association between capital flows to government-supported in-
dustries and financial crises.
1.2 Governments and the private sector
One of the main contributions of this chapter is the use of unique sectoral catego-
rizations in order to highlight the role that government-supported industries played in
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financial crises in emerging economies from 1880-1913. Simply relying on measures of
total capital inflows misses this distinction. Likewise, while previous studies have di-
vided capital inflows into government, railway, and non-railway private sectors, this fails
to take into account the significance of the connections between governments and rail-
ways, banks, and public utilities (Bordo and Meissner, 2011). Refining the analysis by
looking at capital flows to the government, government-supported, and non-government-
supported sectors allows for a more pointed analysis of the factors that were associated
with financial crises at this time.
Political and economic development were both necessary precursors for overseas Eu-
ropean investment in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries (Edelstein, 1982,
p. 39).1 An important part of these developments is the direct connections between
governments and private investment activities. Railways are a prominent example of
this relationship, as railway financing was often supported by government-guaranteed
rates of return and exclusion from local taxes (Cottrell, 1975, p. 28). Rippy (1959)
notes how in 1890 over three quarters of railways in which British investors held shares
paid dividends. And “thanks mainly to government guaranties, apparently none failed
to service its preferred shares or debentures” (ibid., p. 44). These types of guarantees
left governments responsible for assuring returns to investors even when the investment
projects faced financial difficulties.
Mexico offers a case in point. Since independence Mexico experienced “[m]ost of
the dramatic events that could possibly happen to a country in terms of foreign direct
investment” (Twomey, 2000, p. 179). Railroads played a significant role in this drama
around the turn of the century. The Mexican government provided generous financial
1In turn-of-the-century Mexico, for example, “the firm rule of Díaz gave [foreign investors] promise
of continued stability and of steady material development” (Wynne, 1951, p. 47). Passanati (2007) and
Weller (2015) present in-depth studies of the ways Mexican officials secured foreign funding around the
turn of the century.
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aid to support railway construction during the 1870s-80s (Wynne, 1951; Carden, 1893).
In the Mexican case, this aid came as grants for every mile of tracks that was built
(Wynne, 1951; Long, 1925). Alternatively, the Mexican government paid interest on
the capital used in railway construction, and shares of custom duties were guaranteed
to bondholders (Wynne, 1951; Denys, 1890; Maurer and Gomberg, 2004). In the case
of the Tehuantepec railway, the government paid the contracted party for the materials
and work done in the early stages of the project. Even when that contract was canceled
before the railroad was finished, the government also paid the profit that would have
been earned had the project been finished on time (Romero and Corthell, 1894). Many
Mexican railway projects received this type of substantial financial assistance. These
subsidies could range in value from one-third to two-thirds of the total cost of the
railway construction (Powell, 1921; see also Hardy, 1934, p. 249, and Ficker, 2000, p.
268 ).
Mexican railway construction, however, occurred during a time of financial hardship
for the federal government. The country was in a period of default and debt restructuring
through the first years of the sample period (1880-1885). During this time, the Mexican
government subsidized railway construction even at the expense of servicing foreign debt
obligations. Without this financial assistance, however, Wynne argues that there would
have been very limited interest from foreign investors in taking a stake in Mexican
railways, due to the relative underdevelopment of the country (Wynne, 1951, p. 49).
As mentioned, one way for the Mexican government to encourage foreign investment
was to promise a share of customs revenues to investors. These revenues were also
mortgaged by the federal government. This practice could cover as much as 90 percent
of customs revenues at particular ports, such as Matamoros and Tampico (Maurer and
Gomberg, 2004, p. 1096). In the mid-1880s, this “hidden debt” combined with the
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government’s stated deficit grew to the point where foreign railway investment dried up,
requiring an overhaul of the country’s financial arrangements (ibid.).
The Tehuantepec railway exemplifies how tenuous railway investments could be.
This railway was to cross the Tehuantepec isthmus in southern Mexico, offering a route
between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans north of the Panama railroad. But financing
this project was difficult. In his address to Congress in September 1885, President
Díaz ordered that construction be halted on this line while the government continued
to sort out its finances (Economist, 1885, p. 1294). In 1899 this project was refinanced
(Economist, 1899, p. 978). As in the cases described above, the government assumed
responsibility should any shortcomings arise (Wynne, 1951).
These guarantees persisted even through revolutionary developments in Mexico. In
1911 revolutionary forces overthrew Díaz’s government. Díaz was a strong ruler who
provided a sense of security and stability for foreign investors. The revolution changed
that equation, but the new government still sought to follow through on debt obligations
taken up by the previous administration. During the first days of 1914, for example, the
government continued to assure investors that they could count on previously promised
railway investment guarantees (Wynne, 1951). Still, the Mexican Treasury declared
bankruptcy on January 13, 1914.
Late nineteenth century Peruvian governments faced similar problems due to their
ties to railroad investments. For example, bonds issued in 1869 on behalf of the Na-
tional Piso and Yca Railway Company were completely guaranteed by the government
of Peru (Wynne, 1951, p. 116). This guarantee was based on the surpluses from guano
sales, using the funds remaining after payments toward the national debt and an ear-
lier railway mortgage. Subsequent railway investment projects through the 1870s were
much larger. Foreign financing for these projects was not only secured by guarantees
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of guano surpluses, but again through the mortgaging of earlier railway projects and
through custom revenues.
The Peruvian government ran into problems, however, as public debt increased and
faith in the guano market wavered. Public debt tripled from £12 million in 1870 to £36
million by 1872 (Economist, 1872, p. 352). As foreign financing for investment projects
in Peru was based on guano sales, and there was no way to verify the future prospects
of these sales, the Economist warned that “[w]hen people lend to Peru therefore they
are simply speculating in guano” (1872, p. 353). The costs of main railway projects
exceeded their budgets, and were extended beyond what was needed in the country. It
became apparent that these railways were unlikely to offer a net return (Wynne, 1951,
p. 120).
Unfortunately for the Peruvian government, the guano market weakened in the early
1870s due to competition from artificial fertilizers. In 1873 the government’s revenues
from guano sales were barely sufficient for covering its foreign debt obligations, a signifi-
cant part of which was railway financing. A year later President Pardo told the Peruvian
parliament that “[s]uch enormous loans soon crippled us, as the railways were unpro-
ductive . . . then came failures and suspensions and all the troubles that have reduced
Peru to her present wretched condition” (Economist, 1875, quoted in Vizcarra, 2004, p.
382). The following year, 1876, Peru was compelled to default on its external debt.
Peruvian banks were also pulled into these problematic arrangements. As the gov-
ernment became increasingly caught up in unsustainable foreign financial obligations, it
began to pressure domestic financial institutions to help it cope with these circumstances
(Quiroz, 1993, pp. 38-42). The government used internal debt instruments to guarantee
banks’ monetary issues, while the banks lent the depreciating paper currency to the
state (see also Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). Quiroz (1993, p. 40) emphases how these
connections between public and private institutions were destabilizing, as “[t]hese ma-
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noeuvres between public and private interests enabled each to cover up in inefficiency.”
Tellingly, the only financial institutions with branches in Peru that avoided bankruptcy
during the early 1880s were commercial banks that did not get caught up in these un-
stable relationships with the government (because these banks specialized in short-term
commercial credit) (Quiroz, 1993, pp. 41-42).
These Latin American cases show how costly railway guarantees could be for national
governments, and how destabilizing it could be for government and private financial in-
terests to become too intertwined (see Lewis, 1983, for more on Mexico, Peru, Argentina,
and Chile; for more on the Brazilian case see: Abreau, 2000; Eisenberg, 1974; Graham,
1968; Lewis, 1983; and Summerhill 2003). This phenomenon extended beyond Latin
America. Frankel (1938) documents a range of such cases in various African contexts.
Incentives such as land and mineral concessions were used to induce railroad construc-
tion. Such concessions could result, however, in the requiring of additional government-
subsidized capital investment in order to extract the minerals. This furthered the ties
between private industry and governments. In the Belgian Congo, for example, the
state was compelled to guarantee part of the capital required by mining companies, in
addition to capital required for the railway construction itself (Frankel, 1938, p. 376).
This granting of concessions often “led merely to speculation, fraud, and the destruction
of indigenous resources” (ibid.). This suggests that moral hazard issues arose due to
government guarantees, as firms abused the security offered by these guarantees in order
to make a profit at the government’s expense.
Overall, government and private interests became significantly intertwined during
this time of global financial integration. In South Africa this even led to there being
a “tradition of identifying the railway policy with that of the Government” despite the
investment coming from private sources (Frankel, 1938, p. 384). This type of relationship
between public and private interests was seen later in the colonial era as well. In a 1932
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report on railways in Kenya and Uganda, it was noted that “the entire task of success
or failure of the railway falls upon the government of the colonies as directly as though
the railway accounts were merged with the colonial budgets” (Gibb, 1932, quoted in
Frankel, 1938, p. 387).
It is also important to note that while railroads were prominent recipients of foreign
capital during this period, other industries were also strongly tied to the government.
Banks were part of this phenomenon, as even state-run banks could get caught up in fren-
zies of private speculative activity (Marichal, 1989, pp. 137-42; Maurer and Gomberg,
2004; La Porta et al., 2002, find similar connections between state banks and crises
in the late twentieth century). Additionally, as mentioned above, non-state-run banks
could also have destabilizing relationships with government finances, through domestic
lending channels (Quiroz, 1993; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). As another example, Hick-
son and Turner (2002) describe how capital inflows to Australia through the 1880s led to
increasingly risky lending practices by commercial banks and land-financing companies.
These private-sector financial institutions were also involved in government finances as
intermediaries. Widespread bank failures resulted when capital inflows were significantly
curtailed in the early 1890s, and the Australian government was compelled to step in as a
lender of last resort. Polsi (1996, p. 133) describes the connections between major indus-
tries, banks, and the government in late-nineteenth-century Italy. The Italian financial
system was weakened by promises that the government could not keep during crises
(ibid., p. 135). Another example of destabilizing connections between governments
and financial institutions is the Banco da República do Brasil. Calomiris and Haber
(2014) show how this bank took advantage of its “implicit too-big-to-fail insurance” in
the 1890s, receiving support from the treasury in order to continue operating but still
failing in the 1900 banking crisis, leaving the government to take on its obligations (p.
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427). Overall, Bordo and Meissner (2016, p. 46) identify government guarantees as
being the “key link” between financial and fiscal crises.
Public utilities also had destabilizing connections with financial institutions and gov-
ernments at this time (Marichal, 1989, p. 147). Aliber and Kindleberger (2011, p. 11)
point out that some nineteenth-century crises were due to bank failures that occurred
after booms in infrastructure investment, including investment in canals. The role the
Buenos Aires Water Supply and Drainage Loan played in the Baring Crisis is a promi-
nent example of this situation (Eichengreen, 1999; Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2008).
Ownership structures of banks and utility companies overlapped to the extent that “it is
particularly difficult to identity who controls railroads; candidates are the directors, the
stock holders, the banks that channel new loans to them, or the host country’s govern-
ment which subsidizes them and controls their rates. . . . A similar problem, of smaller
magnitude, pertains to investment in public utilities” (Twomey, 2000, p. 43). These
trends fit the “diabolic loop” framework described below, whereby a negative feedback
process involving these parties resulted in broader economic instability.
Each of these sectors—railways, banks, and public utilities—can be placed in a “Too
Big to Fail” (TBTF) framework. Major industries in these sectors were often too system-
ically important to be allowed to fail. Within this framework, government guarantees
ensure a firm’s TBTF status even as governments “pursue a policy of ex ante ‘construc-
tive ambiguity’ ” in an attempt to stave off moral hazard issues (Soussa, 2000, p. 9; see
also Wilmarth, 2010).2
To analyze the benefits that accrue to TBTF banks, in particular, Soussa (2000)
models how these firms can secure funding at a lower cost than smaller and less sys-
temically important rivals, securing a higher profit rate for the TBTF banks. This is
2See Gup (2004) and Wright (2013) for more on the historical development of TBTF relationships
between industries and governments.
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illustrated in figure 1.1, where D is the demand for deposits, and SL and SD1 are the
supply of loans and deposits, respectively. In a perfectly competitive banking system,
M represents the equilibrium supply of loans and deposits. At this point, the lending
rate is i1 and the deposit rate is i0, and the difference between these rates is the bank’s
profit pi. A TBTF bank benefits from its TBTF status by receiving funding at a lower
cost (SD2), and the extra profit yielded from this position is shown by pi∗.
Figure 1.1: The effect of a funding subsidy on bank profit
Note: Based on: Soussa, 2000, p. 12.
This simple model helps illustrate the benefits that accrued to government-supported
industries in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century developing economies. Banks,
railways, and public utilities were able to operate, make interest payments, and engage
in speculative activities because of the support they received from explicit and implicit
government guarantees. But this also meant that governments were liable to face unfa-
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vorable financial conditions due to firms’ mistakes (or intentional profiteering and price
gouging).
Moral hazard issues meant that railway companies, for example, “had the incentive
to raise capital for lines of questionable economic viability so long as they could obtain
a [government] guarantee” (Eichengreen, 2003, p. 195). Investors then only had to
concern themselves with the creditworthiness of governments, who were obliged to make
up the difference when firms fell short on debt payments (ibid., p. 194). This is the
situation described by Brunnermeir et al.’s (2011) “diabolic loop” where governments
and banks get locked in cycles of worsening financial conditions.
Brunnermeir et al. (2011) model spiraling problems from public-private connections
that are analogous to these historical cases. Their analysis is applied to the post-2009
eurozone, where banks are put at risk by their holdings of sovereign debt during a
period of economic uncertainty.3 This undermines banks’ solvency, as banks have too
many risky assets of uncertain value. At the same time, governments face the risk of
having to bail out failed banks, which in turn makes governments’ debts riskier assets
for banks to hold, further increasing the likelihood that banks will need to be rescued
by the government. This whole process undermines economic growth and tax revenue,
further weakening the position of governments and banks. The result is a “diabolic loop”
where these problems increase in an interconnected web of heightened risk and liability.
While the details accounted for in Brunnermeier et al.’s model are specific to the
institutional structure of the twenty-first century eurozone, the general framework of
this model also serves to describe the connections between governments, government-
supported industries, and financial crises in peripheral economies from 1880-1913. Rail-
roads, public utilities, and banks were connected with governments such that when the
3For more on “diabolic” or “doom” loops see Farhi and Tirole (2015). Winkler (2011) connects the
experience of US banks in the nineteenth century to similar problems facing the eurozone today.
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government-supported sector was in trouble this could result in a sovereign default.
Uncertainty about the stability and profitability of these sectors could lead to broader
economic instability, as when foreign capital stopped flowing to Peruvian railway projects
when intertwined private sector and government finances became perceived as unduly
risky. Moral hazard issues are an important part of this analysis. This is noted in the
literature on modern capital flows and financial crises (Sarno and Taylor, 1999; Lipsey,
2001; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998, p. 44). In the historical cases analyzed here, cap-
ital flows were also subject to moral hazard issues, as governments became involved in
supporting particular infrastructural and financial developments. The empirical section
below finds positive and statistically significant connections between these capital flows
to the government-supported sector and financial crises.
1.3 Data
Capital flows from industrial Europe to emerging economies were a significant feature
of the global economy during this period of international integration. This chapter em-
ploys newly compiled data on capital flows, from the industrial core of Europe (Britain,
Germany, and France) to peripheral, emerging economies around the world. Previous
research on the impacts that these flows had on capital-importing economies has mostly
relied on British data from Stone (1999; building on earlier work by Jenks, 1927, 1944,
and Simon, 1967, 1968) (e.g., Bordo and Meissner, 2007, 2011; Schularick and Steger,
2010).
This chapter builds on this line of research, using an expanded panel dataset which
includes capital flows from Germany and France as well as Britain. The German data
come from Esteves (2007), and the French data are from recent archival research by Rui
Esteves (building on Esteves, 2011; see the “French data appendix” at the end of this
dissertation for more information on the French capital flow series). Including this range
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of data allows for a greatly expanded picture of capital exports from Europe in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Previous studies used Stone’s (1999) data as
a proxy for all European capital exports at this time. But France and Germany were
also investing abroad and it is important to include this information in order to gain a
more complete picture of capital outflows from the industrial core of Europe during this
globalized era. In addition to including the French and German data, I digitized Stone’s
dataset to create the expanded dataset used in this chapter. The expanded dataset
allows for a more disaggregated analysis of capital flows than in earlier studies.
These capital flow measures are complemented by additional historical data, drawn
from sources such as Clemens and Williamson (2004b). This includes information on a
wide range of factors, including GDP, imports, exports, inflation, schooling, and political
stability, as discussed in detail below (see also table A.1 in the data appendix). This
expanded dataset allows for more historical information to be incorporated into analyses
of capital flows and financial crises than in previous analyses.
The capital flow data are entered in the dataset by individual exporting country
(Britain, France, or Germany) as well as for all three countries combined. The sectors
into which the capital flows data are divided include: government; railroads; shipping;
canals; ports; electric lighting and power; gas; telegraphs and telephones; tramways and
omnibuses; waterworks; banks and discount companies; financial land and investment;
financial trusts; insurance; raw materials (mines, nitrates, oil tea, coffee, and rubber);
and an industrial and miscellaneous category (breweries and distilleries; commercial and
industrial; iron, coal, and steel).
These data are combined into six sectors: government; railways; public utilities;
financial; raw materials; and industrial and miscellaneous. I reclassify these industries
into government-supported, government, and non-government-supported private sectors.
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Sectoral categorization for late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century economies
is not straightforward. Analyzing Britain’s 1913 foreign investment portfolio, Nurkse
(1954) describes capital flows to governments, railroads, and public utilities collectively
as “public or public-utility investments” (p. 747). Similarly, Clemens and Williamson
(2004a) argue that “[w]e must be cautious, of course, in drawing a hard and clear line
between flows to governments and flows to the private sector, as Simon, Jenks and Stone
defined them” (p. 330). Railroads, for example, while not falling under the government
category in Stone’s dataset, were nonetheless supported by land grants, subsidies, and
loan guarantees, which tied them to governments. And, as described above, banks and
public utilities often shared similarly destabilizing connections with governments.
These issues reinforce the argument in favor of combining measures of capital flows
to railways, public utilities, and banks together in a “government-supported” sector.
Additionally, since this chapter includes data on German and French capital flows, it
is important to highlight the significance of the government and government-supported
sectors, as capital exports from Germany and France were even more likely to go to
governments and government-supported industries than were British capital exports
(Nurkse, 1954, p. 749; Fishlow, 1985, p. 352).
14
Figure 1.2: Percentage of capital flows going to each sector, 1880-1913 (new definitions)
Sources: British capital flow data are from Stone (1999), French capital flow data
are from Esteves (2011, 2015), German capital flow data are from Esteves (2007a).
The breakdown of how much of the capital exports from Britain, France, and Ger-
many went to each of these sectors in the capital importing countries is shown in fig-
ures 1.3 to 1.5. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 present more detailed information about the capital
inflows to the government, government-supported, and non-government-supported sec-
tors of the capital-importing countries in the sample.
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Figure 1.3: British capital exports, 1880-1913
Source: Stone (1999).
Figure 1.4: German capital exports, 1880-1913
Source: Esteves (2007a).
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Figure 1.5: French capital exports, 1880-1913
Source: Esteves (2011, 2015).
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Table 1.1: Capital flows by sector and country, 1880-1913 (m£)
Variable Description
K total Total capital inflows
K supported Capital inflows to govt-supported sector
K govt Capital inflows to government
K non-supported Capital inflows to other private sector industries
Note: Capital flow variables are logged and scaled by the nominal GDP
of the capital importing country in that year.
Sources: Capital flow measures are for capital imports from Britain, France,
and Germany. British capital export measures are from Stone (1999), Ger-
man capital export measures are from Esteves (2007a), and French capital
export measures are from data newly compiled by Rui Esteves (2015, build-
ing on Esteves, 2011).
Table 1.2: Capital flows by sector and country, 1880-1913 (m£)
Exporting country Britain France Germany Total
Importing sector Govt Sup. Non-sup. Govt Sup. Non-sup. Govt Sup. Non-sup. Total
Argentina 62.9 229.7 17.2 47.3 63.3 1.1 19.7 6.6 0.4 442.5
Australia 178.0 47.0 57.9 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 265.9
Brazil 64.9 68.4 13.6 40.6 49.0 8.4 7.7 3.2 0.4 247.0
Canada 96.4 183.9 56.2 1.8 16.4 1.8 0.0 4.5 0.0 348.6
Chile 21.6 16.4 14.5 2.4 1.1 2.1 5.7 9.0 0.1 72.2
Egypt 8.4 28.2 4.2 5.7 52.1 6.2 2.0 0.5 0.0 93.6
Greece 15.2 0.9 1.1 9.2 3.7 0.7 4.0 0.0 0.0 31.5
India 121.5 92.7 22.6 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 218.3
Italy 22.5 11.6 2.1 0.0 10.4 1.0 8.7 31.7 0.0 66.4
Japan 69.4 4.9 0.6 56.3 1.1 0.0 12.0 0.0 0.0 144.3
Mexico 15.1 43.5 16.9 0.0 21.2 2.9 14.1 4.4 1.0 115.6
New Zealand 33.0 16.8 8.5 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 52.8
Peru 1.3 6.0 3.3 0.0 1.8 0.2 0.6 0.0 0.3 12.5
Russia 28.6 26.9 20.4 188.9 93.2 36.6 62.8 76.9 4.8 535.5
Uruguay 7.1 15.5 0.2 4.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.1 0.0 28.1
United States 30.4 530.0 120.8 0.0 44.5 18.7 0.4 56.3 0.1 745.3
Notes: This table shows the capital exports from Britain, France, and Germany to capital-importing countries
from 1880-1913. The capital flows are disaggregated into the government (govt), government-supported (sup.),
and non-government-supported (non-sup.) sectors. Sources: British capital flow data are from Stone (1999),
French capital flow data are from Esteves (2011, 2015), German capital flow data are from Esteves (2007a).
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In the empirical analyses below, capital flows to each country are scaled by nominal
GDP. The capital flow variables (the log of one plus the capital flow measure scaled by
GDP)4 are coded in the regression results as Total for the total capital flows to a given
country in a given year, Supported for capital flows to the government-supported sectors
of the economy, Government for capital flows to the government directly, and Non-
supported for capital flows to the non-government-supported private sector (table 1.1
and figure 1.6).
Figure 1.6: British, German, and French capital exports (with “basic” French series), 1880-
1913
Sources: British capital flow data are from Stone (1999), French capital flow data
are from Esteves (2011, 2015), German capital flow data are from Esteves (2007a).
4This transformation ensures that zero values of capital flows remain in the analysis.
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In addition to data on capital flows, we have data on a wide range of other factors
for the capital-importing countries. These data and their sources are described in more
detail in the data appendix (tables 1.1, 1.2 and A.2). In brief, these variables include
economic indicators such as exports, imports, and inflation, as well as information about
the countries themselves, such as distance from London, amount of arable land, urban-
ization rates, and population growth rates. I also construct a variable to capture the
fiscal stress facing these economies. This is calculated as the actual cost of servicing
a country’s debt divided by the government’s ability to service the debt (proxied by
government revenue). Altogether this dataset allows us to control for more variables
than has been undertaken in previous research on this subject.
The baseline empirical specifications include a parsimonious range of these control
variables. I used repeated regression and variable selection methods to determine which
variables to include in the main econometric analysis. Also, the controls I use are similar
to the explanatory variables used in previous research on turn-of-the-century capital
flows and crises (Flandreau and Zumer, 2004; Bordo and Meissner, 2011; Meissner,
2013). These control variables are: terms of trade; trade account; government deficit
divided by revenue; gold standard membership; the three months bills rate in London;
and the measure of fiscal stress defined above. Correlation among many of these variables
is a concern, but the results are robust to various specifications (e.g., dropping the trade
account measure, which can capture similar effects as the terms of trade measure). I also
run regressions with the extended list of control variables, and the results hold (capital
flows to government-supported industries continue to have a positive and statistically
significant association with financial crises).
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Table 1.3: Countries and crises in sample
Country Default Currency Crisis Banking Crisis
Argentina 1890-93 1885, 1890, 1908 1885, 1890-91
Australia 1893
Brazil 1898 1889, 1898 1890-92, 1897-98, 1900-01
Canada 1891, 1893, 1908 1906, 1908, 1912
Chile 1880-83 1887, 1889, 1898 1898, 1907
Egypt 1900 1907
Greece 1894-97 1885
India 1894 1908
Italy 1894, 1908 1887, 1891, 1893, 1907
Japan 1900, 1904, 1908 1882-85, 1901, 1907
Mexico 1880-85 1883, 1893, 1908, 1913
New Zealand 1903
Peru 1880-89 1893
Russia 1891 1896
Uruguay 1891 1893, 1898
United States 1891 1884, 1890, 1893, 1907
Note: Sudden stops do not enter the crisis measures used as dependent vari-
ables in this chapter, but previous research has found a connection between
sudden stops of capital flows and financial crises (e.g., Bordo, Cavallo, and
Meissner, 2010).
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009); Bordo and Meissner (2007); Esteves
(2007b); Suter (1990).
For dependent variables there are various types of financial crises to consider (ta-
ble A.2). In most of the empirical analyses below I use a binary measure of whether any
(or multiple) types of crises began in a given country in a given year. Table B.1 shows
the years each country experienced a currency, banking, or debt crisis, or a sudden stop
of capital flows. Using this information, I construct new crisis indicators. Since sovereign
defaults could take years to negotiate, I focus on the first year of crisis periods, in order
to analyze the main factors that contributed to the onset of the actual crisis.5 Addi-
tionally, in some of the analyses the dependent variable accounts for banking, currency,
or twin crises, while sovereign defaults enter the regressions as an explanatory variable
(see the discussion of mechanisms below).
5The duration of default periods has been studied elsewhere (e.g., Esteves and Jalles (2016) and
Trebesch (2009).
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Figure 1.7: Total capital flows and crises, 1880-1913
Note: The bars represent the total number of crises (banking, currency, and/or
default) in each year, across the sample.
Sources: The capital flow data are from Stone (1999) and Esteves (2007, 2011,
2015). The crises data are from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Bordo and Meissner
(2007), Esteves (2007b), and Suter (1990).
With these capital flow measures as dependent variables, the empirical analysis fo-
cuses on the connections between capital flows and financial crises. Figure 1.7 super-
imposes capital flows on crises from 1880-1913. The international crisis periods around
1890 and 1907 stand out in both sets of data. The spikes in capital flows in the years
leading up to major crisis periods suggests a role for these flows in precipitating crises.
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Figure 1.8: Capital inflows by sector
Sources: Stone (1999) and Esteves (2007, 2011, 2015).
Figure 1.9: Capital flows to the government-supported sector, by industry
Sources: Stone (1999) and Esteves (2007, 2011, 2015).
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Figure 1.8 shows how much of these capital flows were going to each of the three
sectors—the government, government-supported, and non-government-supported pri-
vate sectors. This highlights how most capital inflows went to the government and
government-supported sectors. Figure 1.9 shows that in most years around three-
quarters of the capital flows to the government-supported sector went to railroads, with
the rest going to financial services and public utilities. The empirical analyses below
demonstrate that it was capital flows to the government-supported sectors of peripheral
economies that were most strongly associated with financial crises during this era of
financial globalization.
1.4 Empirical analysis
Across the global periphery at the turn of the last century there is evidence suggest-
ing that capital inflows to government-supported sectors were associated with financial
crises. Contemporaries were aware of this connection. To test for this connection em-
pirically, the overall approach I take is to have various indicators of financial crises as
dependent variables, and capital flow measures as the main independent variables of
interest. Each model includes either aggregate capital flows or separate measures of
capital flows to the government, government-supported, and non-government-supported
sectors. Collinearity could be a concern in this last case (Bordo and Meissner, 2011, p.
78), but the overall results hold whether the capital flows enter the regressions separately
or at the same time.
A range of control variables are also used, to account for other factors that could
influence the financial stability of these economies. Some of these controls, such as gold
standard membership and debt levels, were selected based on previous studies. Other
controls were added because they were found to be important through the use of stepwise
regression methods. These variables were selected by regressing the crisis indicator on
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unique combinations of control variables. As an additional check of this method, I also
use a “kitchen sink” approach which includes a wider range of controls. Additionally,
regressions are run using principal components, in order to capture the most relevant
features from the extensive dataset. Overall, the results suggest that capital flows to
government-supported sectors such as railroads, banks, and public utilities had more of
an impact on financial crises than did capital flows directly to the government or the
non-government-supported private sector.
1.4.1 Baseline
The baseline regressions take the following form:
Crisisi,t = Ci,t + β1CapitalF lowsi,t−1 + β2Xi,t−1 + i,t (1)
In the baseline linear regressions (table 1.4), Crisis is a dummy variable that takes
the value of one if there was any crisis in country i in year t. A constant term, C, is
included in the regressions, along with lagged capital flows (CapitalF lows) to the spec-
ified sectors (total, government-supported, government, or non-government-supported).
Additional lagged explanatory variables X are also included, along with an error term,
. Country and year dummies are added to further variations of these regressions (ta-
ble 1.4, columns 6-10). In each of the regressions below, the sample is limited to the
years 1883-1913, because German capital flows only enter the data from 1883.
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Table 1.4: Linear regressions
Dependent variable:
Beginning of crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
K total 0.7222*** 0.8623***
(0.2347) (0.3059)
K supported 1.1647*** 0.9778*** 1.5144*** 1.2241***
(0.3924) (0.3707) (0.4984) (0.4548)
K government 0.7756** 0.5862** 0.8078** 0.6341**
(0.3051) (0.2441) (0.3341) (0.2624)
K non-supported 1.1846 -0.2144 2.4526 1.0793
(1.9349) (1.7766) (2.6290) (2.2457)
Terms of trade 0.0007 0.0008 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0009 0.0009 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009)
Current account -0.0009* -0.0010** -0.0010* -0.0010* -0.0009* -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0008
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Deficit/revenue -0.0212 -0.0171 -0.0201 -0.0144 -0.0209 -0.0081 -0.0037 -0.0085 -0.0024 -0.0067
(0.0152) (0.0115) (0.0149) (0.0107) (0.0150) (0.0119) (0.0126) (0.0119) (0.0132) (0.0124)
Gold 0.0284 0.0230 0.0305 0.0231 0.0282 0.0544 0.0598 0.0552 0.0574 0.0559
(0.0253) (0.0252) (0.0255) (0.0252) (0.0252) (0.0488) (0.0486) (0.0485) (0.0483) (0.0488)
Consols -0.0751 -0.0775 -0.0640 -0.0541 -0.0804 -0.3328 -0.3592 -0.3218 -0.3554 -0.3433
(0.0526) (0.0511) (0.0506) (0.0484) (0.0512) (0.2731) (0.2711) (0.2701) (0.2701) (0.2766)
Fiscal stress -0.1705 -0.1700 -0.1424 -0.1286 -0.1752 -0.0710 -0.0756 -0.0581 -0.1046 -0.0777
(0.1169) (0.1244) (0.1112) (0.1140) (0.1217) (0.2525) (0.2709) (0.2535) (0.2628) (0.2801)
N 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403
Country FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables are lagged one period. Constant term is included in the regressions but
omitted from the table for brevity. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
The results from the panel linear regressions are presented in table 1.4. The main
finding is that capital flows to the government-supported sector are significantly as-
sociated with financial crises. A one standard deviation increase in capital flows to
the government-supported sector raises the probability of a financial crisis by around
three percentage points. The coefficients for total capital inflows and capital inflows to
governments are also positive and significant, but are of a lesser magnitude than the
coefficients on the capital flows to the government-supported sector. Adding country
and year dummies (columns 6-10) does not greatly alter these results. Both with and
without fixed effects, the coefficient for government-supported capital flows is positive
and significantly related to crises, and is of greater magnitude than the other significant
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coefficient (for capital flows to governments) when all capital flow measures are included
simultaneously (columns 5 and 10).
None of the control variables are consistently significant. The terms of trade estimate
is positive, which is unexpected, but the magnitude is small. The current account esti-
mates are also very small. The deficit over revenue results are negative, suggesting that
government borrowing could have a stabilizing effect on capital-importing economies.
Gold standard membership is not significantly associated with crises, nor is the fiscal
stress measure. In most of the regressions consols have a significant relationship of siz-
able magnitude with crises, but the negative sign is a puzzle that needs to be explored
further.
I also run regressions with an extended range of additional control variables, to al-
lay concerns that the results of the baseline linear regressions are being driven by the
particular set of explanatory variables that was included. These results are presented
in table 1.5. Capital inflows to the government-supported sector are consistently signifi-
cant and are of greater magnitude than the other capital flow estimates, highlighting the
connection between capital flows to this sector and incidence of financial crisis. None
of the control variables in table 1.5 are consistently significant across all the regres-
sions. Overall the results in this table provide further evidence that capital flows to the
government-supported sector were more strongly associated with the onset of crises than
were the other variables included in these regressions.
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Table 1.5: Linear regressions with additional explanatory variables
Dependent variable:
Beginning of crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
K total 0.7260*** 0.9750***
(0.2818) (0.3091)
K supported 1.3146*** 1.1455*** 1.5863*** 1.3121**
(0.3882) (0.4027) (0.5240) (0.5510)
K government 0.6494* 0.4518 0.9474** 0.7608*
(0.3486) (0.3210) (0.4044) (0.4252)
K non-supported 2.0325 0.5415 2.6098 0.8751
(2.8444) (2.6545) (4.1399) (3.9549)
Population growth -0.0010 -0.0008 0.0047 0.0089 -0.0029 0.0403** 0.0431** 0.0398* 0.0422** 0.0405**
(0.0113) (0.0095) (0.0105) (0.0093) (0.0109) (0.0198) (0.0195) (0.0208) (0.0196) (0.0198)
School 0.1182* 0.1119* 0.1098 0.0917 0.1186* 0.4678* 0.4383 0.4915* 0.3861 0.4592
(0.0665) (0.0657) (0.0697) (0.0767) (0.0706) (0.2786) (0.2961) (0.2754) (0.3258) (0.3240)
Exports p.c. -0.0436 -0.0928 -0.0121 -0.0698 -0.0681 0.9253** 0.7351* 0.9890** 0.7658* 0.8779*
(0.2212) (0.2360) (0.2277) (0.2360) (0.2461) (0.3825) (0.3833) (0.4128) (0.4285) (0.4715)
Arable land 0.0526** 0.0466* 0.0502* 0.0444 0.0511** -7.9324*** -7.1509*** -7.8715*** -6.5662*** -7.8074***
(0.0259) (0.0254) (0.0280) (0.0278) (0.0259) (1.3975) (1.4407) (1.3059) (1.5293) (1.4708)
Terms of trade 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008 0.0011 0.0012 0.0010 0.0011 0.0011
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Current account -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0014** -0.0014*** -0.0013*** -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Deficit/revenue -0.0258 -0.0216 -0.0251 -0.0205 -0.0244 -0.0116 -0.0078 -0.0121 -0.0062 -0.0107
(0.0195) (0.0146) (0.0192) (0.0141) (0.0183) (0.0108) (0.0103) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0118)
Colony -0.0184 -0.0169 -0.0162 -0.0193 -0.0184 -0.0313 -0.0164 -0.0500 -0.0210 -0.0248
(0.0268) (0.0257) (0.0274) (0.0273) (0.0258) (0.0327) (0.0367) (0.0326) (0.0475) (0.0518)
Gold 0.0212 0.0129 0.0205 0.0085 0.0188 0.0627 0.0634 0.0599 0.0544 0.0642
(0.0440) (0.0417) (0.0446) (0.0416) (0.0453) (0.0442) (0.0425) (0.0436) (0.0434) (0.0453)
Tariff -0.0016 -0.0011 -0.0015 -0.0014 -0.0014 0.0051** 0.0047* 0.0056** 0.0045 0.0049
(0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0030)
Spread 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Consols -0.0597 -0.0656 -0.0488 -0.0364 -0.0653 -0.1303 -0.1988 -0.0962 -0.1809 -0.1514
(0.0568) (0.0557) (0.0548) (0.0515) (0.0563) (0.3252) (0.3214) (0.3277) (0.3326) (0.3468)
Real exch. rate -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0006** -0.0006* -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0007
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Fiscal stress -0.0775 -0.0826 -0.0605 -0.0543 -0.0838 0.0956 0.0717 0.1315 0.0486 0.0842
(0.1117) (0.1158) (0.1093) (0.1075) (0.1137) (0.2565) (0.2697) (0.2350) (0.2656) (0.3250)
N 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387 387
Country FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables are lagged one period. Constant term is included in the regressions but omitted from
the table for brevity. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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1.4.2 Dynamic fixed effects
While the probit specification is useful for studying the relationship between capital
inflows and financial crises, it does not address endogeneity concerns. As discussed in
the robustness checks section below, generalized method of moments (GMM) techniques
are not appropriate for this analysis because of the relatively large time dimension of the
panel. Instead, I use a dynamic fixed effects (DFE) model, which yields estimates of the
long-run and short-run correlations between the dependent and explanatory variables
(Pesaran and Smith, 1995; Bordo and Meissner, 2011, pp. 73-74). Tests for cointegration
following Westerlund (2007) were not successful because the data are not continuous.6
Two related techniques, the mean group (MG) estimator and the pooled mean group
(PMG) model, do not work with this dataset, but the DFE model yields results and also
allows for clustering by country.7
The DFE results are shown in table 1.6.8 The table is divided into two sections. The
top panel contains the long-run estimates from the cointegrating vector. The bottom
panel has the short-run dynamic coefficients. The long-run results are similar to those
from the baseline regressions (table 1.4). The long-run (top panel) coefficient for total
capital flows is positive and significant, as is the coefficient for government-supported
capital flows, which is also more than double the magnitude of the total capital flow
6Bignon, Esteves, and Herranz-Loncán (2015, p. 1296) use a similarly structured dataset covering
this time period. When setting up their DFE analysis, they follow Westerlund’s test for cointegration
and remark that: “Even though we could not reject the absence of cointegration between our variables,
we are aware of the low power of these tests with relatively short time dimensions for each individual
cross section unit. Consequently, we still estimated our model as a cointegrated panel.”
7Samargandi, Fidrmuc, and Ghosh (2013) present a detailed overview of the differences between the
DFE, MG, and PMG models.
8As with the baseline probit regressions, the binary “start of crisis” measure is used as the dependent
variable in the DFE model. These regressions were run again with the non-binary “cumulative number
of crises” measure as the dependent variable. The main difference in the results between these two
methods is that the long-run coefficient for capital flows to the non-government-supported sector is
significant when the cumulative crises measure is the dependent variable.
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coefficient. When all three capital flow measures are included together (column 5), the
government-supported capital flow coefficient is the only significant capital flow result.
As in the baseline regressions, the current account coefficients are negative and signifi-
cant, though small in magnitude. In the short run (bottom panel), the the coefficients
for government-supported capital flows (columns 2 and 5) are again positive, and are the
only significant capital flow results. In the short run, the coefficient for current account
is only significant in two of the five regressions. Also, gold standard membership has
a consistently negative and significant association with crises in these short-run results,
and fiscal stress has a positive coefficient which is significant in regressions, 2, 4, and 5.
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Table 1.6: Dynamic fixed effects
Dependent variable:
Beginning of crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Long-run coefficients
K total 0.6747***
(0.2525)
K supported 2.0290*** 2.1075***
(0.4629) (0.5999)
K government 0.2612 -0.2429
(0.2980) (0.5673)
K non-supported 1.4683 -1.2447
(2.8614) (2.8713)
Terms of trade 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0017)
Current account -0.0014** -0.0013*** -0.0015** -0.0015** -0.0014**
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Deficit/revenue -0.0196 -0.0152 -0.0151 -0.0143 -0.0131
(0.0126) (0.0133) (0.0130) (0.0136) (0.0130)
Gold 0.0174 0.0221 0.0173 0.0170 0.0232
(0.0489) (0.0493) (0.0499) (0.0503) (0.0503)
Consols -0.0550 -0.0696 -0.0426 -0.0363 -0.0706
(0.0578) (0.0564) (0.0574) (0.0534) (0.0519)
Fiscal stress 0.0475 0.0925 0.0791 0.1093 0.0893
(0.2068) (0.2152) (0.2146) (0.2155) (0.2275)
Short-run coefficients
Error correction coefficient -1.1261*** -1.1308*** -1.1204*** -1.1256*** -1.1293***
(0.0240) (0.0247) (0.0227) (0.0249) (0.0252)
∆ K total 0.0226
(0.2432)
∆ K supported 1.3960** 1.6293**
(0.6137) (0.7906)
∆ K government -0.4437 -0.6122
(0.4138) (0.5073)
∆ K non-supported 0.0466 -1.3714
(3.7115) (3.9257)
∆ Terms of trade -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0004
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012)
∆ Current account -0.0011* -0.0011 -0.0012* -0.0011 -0.0012
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
∆ Deficit/revenue -0.0042 -0.0034 -0.0008 -0.0035 -0.0002
(0.0128) (0.0136) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0151)
∆ Gold -0.1923** -0.1956** -0.1842** -0.1948** -0.1828**
(0.0757) (0.0759) (0.0742) (0.0836) (0.0767)
∆ Consols 0.0411 0.0593 0.0456 0.0626 0.0337
(0.2135) (0.2186) (0.2150) (0.2191) (0.2223)
∆ Fiscal stress 0.4889* 0.5069** 0.5481 0.6503** 0.4730*
(0.2932) (0.2452) (0.3346) (0.3292) (0.2727)
Notes: Dynamic fixed effect regressions: Top panel contains long-run estimates, bottom panel
short-run estimates. Constant term is included in the regressions but omitted from the table for
brevity. Standard errors (clustered by country) in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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1.4.3 Mechanism
The linear and dynamic fixed effects regressions above highlight the association be-
tween capital flows to different sectors and broad measures of financial crises. Yet the
data in this panel are more fine-grained and allow for an analysis of the connections
between capital inflows and particular types of financial crises. Using the same dynamic
fixed effects methodology described above, I also employ a binary measure of whether
a banking crisis, currency crisis, or “twin crisis” (banking and currency crises together)
occurred in a given country in a given year as the dependent variable (table 1.7). A
lagged measure of whether or not it was the first year of a default period is included as
an explanatory variable, in addition to the same capital flow measures and control vari-
ables as before. In each regression the sovereign default dummy variable is positive and
significant, suggesting that defaults were connected with banking/currency/twin crises,
as expected (Bordo and Meissner, 2011, p. 80). This is the case in both the long and
the short run. Comparing these results to those in table 1.6, there remains the long-run
association between capital flows to the government-supported sector and financial crises
(columns 2 and 5).9 This suggests that banking/currency/twin crises were precipitated
by both sovereign defaults and inflows of capital to the government-supported sectors,
in particular.
9Column 6 of table 1.6 excludes the capital flow measures in order to make sure that the inclusion
of the capital flow variables in the other regressions isn’t driving the Default estimates.
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Table 1.7: Dynamic fixed effects, with sovereign defaults as independent variable
Dependent variable:
Bank/currency/twin crises (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Long-run coefficients
K total -0.4543
(0.2904)
K supported 1.0983* 2.0555**
(0.6606) (0.8924)
K government -1.3869*** -1.6764***
(0.3571) (0.4854)
K non-supported -2.4106 -4.5185*
(2.3276) (2.5259)
Default 0.8219** 0.7858** 0.7741** 0.9177** 0.6690*** 0.8711**
(0.3698) (0.3282) (0.3662) (0.3660) (0.2420) (0.3733)
Terms of trade -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0003
(0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0024)
Current account -0.0077*** -0.0071*** -0.0080*** -0.0077*** -0.0080*** -0.0073***
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0019)
Public deficit -0.0610* -0.0658* -0.0524* -0.0663** -0.0519** -0.0627*
(0.0327) (0.0353) (0.0277) (0.0337) (0.0245) (0.0356)
Gold 0.0200 0.0231 0.0188 0.0248 0.0317 -0.0214
(0.0828) (0.0815) (0.0832) (0.0824) (0.0846) (0.0731)
Consols -0.0261 -0.0592 -0.0183 -0.0454 -0.0712 -0.0267
(0.1118) (0.1178) (0.1059) (0.1076) (0.1102) (0.1066)
Fiscal stress 0.6289 0.5746 0.7228 0.6399 0.7052 0.5389*
(0.4741) (0.4572) (0.4703) (0.4682) (0.4838) (0.3276)
Short-run coefficients
Error correction coefficient -0.8877*** -0.8847*** -0.8922*** -0.8847*** -0.8985*** -0.8961***
(0.1190) (0.1207) (0.1172) (0.1199) (0.1191) (0.1126)
∆ K total -0.9201***
(0.2187)
∆ K supported -0.8090 0.0262
(0.5738) (0.4638)
∆ K government -1.3062*** -1.3345***
(0.3437) (0.3590)
∆ K non-supported -0.8496 -1.2840
(2.9120) (2.8617)
∆ Default 0.6896*** 0.6824*** 0.6602*** 0.7353*** 0.6458*** 0.7231***
(0.1324) (0.1189) (0.1197) (0.0979) (0.0781) (0.1180)
∆ Terms of trade -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0010
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013)
∆ Current account -0.0045 -0.0039 -0.0044 -0.0039 -0.0049 -0.0037
(0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0043) (0.0045)
∆ Deficit/revenue -0.0253* -0.0299* -0.0218 -0.0303** -0.0205* -0.0269*
(0.0137) (0.0155) (0.0133) (0.0148) (0.0122) (0.0157)
∆ Gold -0.2108** -0.2263** -0.2075** -0.2279** -0.1959* -0.1416
(0.1047) (0.0998) (0.1031) (0.1056) (0.1004) (0.1278)
∆ Consols 0.0929 0.1217 0.1155 0.1553 0.1006 0.2618
(0.2724) (0.2755) (0.2677) (0.2872) (0.2906) (0.2699)
∆ Fiscal stress 0.6748 0.6235 0.7195 0.7172 0.6573 0.7731*
(0.4982) (0.4608) (0.5076) (0.4661) (0.4863) (0.4364)
Notes: Dynamic fixed effect regressions: Top panel contains long-run estimates, bottom panel short-run esti-
mates. Constant term is included in the regressions but omitted from the table for brevity. Standard errors
(clustered by country) in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Overall, these findings fit the historical evidence from turn-of-the-century peripheral
economies. As governments encouraged foreign investment to build infrastructure such
as railways, moral hazard issues arose with the grants and guarantees offered by gov-
ernments to attract this financing. In case after case this led to government finances
becoming overextended. Unforeseen developments led to crises. The Peruvian govern-
ment, for example, was unable to meet its obligations to railroad financiers after the
market for guano collapsed. And the Mexican government was on the hook for financing
railway projects that exceeded their budgets and planned timelines. As these troubles
mounted, financial crises often ensued.
1.5 Robustness checks
The main results from the above empirical analyses highlight the particularly strong
association between capital flows to government-supported industries and financial crises
from 1880-1913 in developing economies. Overall, the capital flows that went to this
sector were more strongly connected with financial crises than were capital inflows to
the government or the non-government-supported sectors.
A range of additional empirical exercises confirm the main findings from above.10
First, probit regressions are run with the same specifications as the baseline linear re-
gressions above. The results from these probit regressions are presented in tables A.3
and A.4
Table A.3 presents the results from the probit regressions which follow the baseline
linear specifications. The figures in table 1.4 are the estimated marginal effects, making
interpretation more straightforward. Again the dependent variable is the “start of crisis”
measure. The results in columns 1-4 align with the linear regressions, namely, the main
10The results for the robustness checks in the section are shown in the appendix.
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finding is that capital flows to the government-supported sector have a positive and
significant association with the occurrence of financial crises. These estimates are of
greater magnitude than the “total” and “government” capital flow measures, which are
also significant. The signs of the control variables are the same as before, but current
account is now longer significant. The main different with these results compared to the
linear results is that when country fixed effects are added (columns 6-10) the coefficient
for capital flows to the government-supported sector is no longer significant (though is
the magnitude is still greater than that for capital flows to the other sectors). However,
these regressions (columns 6-10) only include country fixed effects, not year fixed effects,
whereas the baseline regressions (table 1.4, columns 6-10) included both. Year fixed
effects had to be excluded here because the probit regressions do not converge when
year fixed effects are included.
Table A.4 reruns the linear regression from table 1.5 using probit regressions. Again,
the capital inflow estimates for the government-supported sector are positive and signifi-
cant, and have the greatest magnitude. The current account estimates are also significant
again. When all the capital flows are included in the same regression (column 5) none of
the estimates are significant, but the magnitudes are similar as before, and collinearity
is again a concern here.
Table A.5 is a linear version of the mechanism tests (table 1.7). The results are simi-
lar. The sovereign default independent variable is positively and significantly associated
with the measure of banking/currency/twin crises. Capital flows to the government-
supported sector (columns 2, 5, 7, and 10) are also consistently positive, significant, and
greater in magnitude than the other capital flow measures.11 The regressions in table A.5
11The last two columns of table A.5 check whether excluding capital flows from these regressions
changes the results for the other variables. Column 12 does this while including country and year fixed
effects. The main difference between columns 11 and 12 is that adding fixed effects makes the terms of
trade and current account estimates significant, but the magnitudes are similar across the regressions.
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are run again for table A.6, this time leaving out the Default variable from the controls.
The results for the capital flows estimates are essentially the same, showing that capital
flows to the government-supported sector are positively and significantly associated with
banking, currency, and twin crises. The main difference in results for the control vari-
ables is that in the fixed effects regressions (columns 6-10) fiscal stress becomes positive
and significant and larger than in table A.5. So while this factor was related to bank-
ing, currency, and twin crises, including defaults as an independent variable (table A.5)
explains more than this fiscal stress variable does.
Another way of accounting for the additional controls in the dataset is to undertake
similar analyses using the principal components described in the data section above (see
the “principal component analysis” appendix at the end of this dissertation for details of
this analysis, including the definitions of the factors). The results (table A.8) align with
the main findings presented above. Capital flows to the government-supported sector
are more strongly associated with crises than are the other capital flow measures. Other
significant results are as follows. “International competitiveness” (ic1 ) is positive and
is significant. A possible interpretation of this result is that countries whose economies
are more connected with other countries are more likely to experience crises. Gold
standard membership (“financial development,” or fd1 ) is positive and significant in
the fixed effects regressions, possibly because adhering to the requirements of the gold
standard strained peripheral economies. The other consistently significant results are
for the variables that account for long- and short-run financing costs (consols and the
three-month bills rate in London, respectively). These coefficients are only significant in
columns 1-5, and are expected to be positive, as increased financing costs would burden
capital-importing countries. Again, the negative sign on the consols estimates remains
a puzzle.
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To account for the possibility that the errors are heteroskedastic and contemporane-
ously correlated across the panels in the dataset, similar regressions are run using panel-
corrected standard error methods. These results are presented in table A.9. Lagged
dependent variables are included in these estimations to capture dynamic effects, but
the results are similar when these are excluded (Beck and Katz, 2011). Capital flows to
the government-supported sector are positively and significantly associated with crises.
These estimates are of a larger magnitude than the estimates for total capital inflows
or capital inflows directly to governments, highlighting the particularly important role
that government-supported sectors played in financial crises. As in table 1.4, the current
account estimates have a consistently negative and significant relationship with crises.
Still it is the capital flows to the government-supported sector that have the strongest
statistical connection to financial crises.
In the main empirical section above, I used a dynamic fixed effects estimator to
separate the long- and short-run connections between capital flows and financial crises,
which was not possible in the baseline regressions. Another method for bringing dynamic
information directly into panel data analyses is to use the GMM techniques developed
by Arellano and Bond (1991). While this deals with the bias that arises from fixed
effects and lagged dependent variables, it is suited for panels with shorter time periods
than this database. To reduce the time dimension of this panel I use five-year averages
(following, e.g., Schularick and Steger, 2010).12 The results from system GMM estima-
tions are presented in table A.10. The main findings align with the results from the
probit, dynamic fixed effects, and linear regressions discussed above: capital flows to
12Acemoglu et al. (2013, p. 27) argue that it is better to create a five-year panel by using observations
from every fifth year. They note that taking averages “introduce[s] a complex pattern of serial correla-
tion, making consistent estimation more difficult.” However, financial crises were relatively infrequent.
Thus averages capture more information for the dependent variable than would be included if I limited
the data to every fifth observation.
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the government-supported sector were more strongly associated with crises than were
measures of “total” or “government” capital inflows. But the Hansen test makes it clear
that this methodology is not suited to these data–the perfect 1.000 value is “unplausi-
bly perfect” (Roodman, 2009, p. 141). This is also made apparent by the number of
instruments, which is significantly more than the number of groups in each specifica-
tion. Thus despite the number of lags being limited to three, instrument proliferation
undermines these results. Overall, the results from these GMM attempts should not be
relied upon too heavily, because of the shape of the panel data, which are better suited
for the dynamic fixed effects methods used in the main empirical analyses above, which
allow for panels with longer time dimensions. Still, it is reassuring that these results
align with the main findings above.
Two additional sets of robustness checks vary the sample that is included in these
analyses. In table A.11 the United States is excluded. There are several reasons why
the United States is a special case, and why I should be careful about including it in
the main analyses. First, after the turn of the century it became a capital exporter,
unlike the other countries in the sample. Also, the United States did not have a system
of government guarantees for banks during this period, so labeling those capital inflows
as being “government-supported” for the U.S. case might not be as accurate as it was
for other countries. Still, the bulk of the capital inflows to the United States were to
railroads, especially in the early years of the twentieth century, so capital flows to banks
are not a significant part of the U.S. story. All the same, dropping the United States from
the analysis does not substantially alter the results. Capital flows to the government-
supported sector are still more strongly associated with crises than are other types of
capital flows. Additionally, in table A.12 the fiscal stress variable is dropped. That
allows Peru to be included in the analysis, as it was previously dropped because I lack
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the data for the fiscal stress variable for that country. Again the results are essentially
the same.
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter adds to the proliferating literature which draws connections between
the “first era of globalization” and today’s relatively open and connected global economic
system (O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999; Bordo, Taylor, and Williamson, 2003). The
focus here is on the connections between capital flows and financial crises. This has
also been the subject of recent research from a historical perspective (e.g., Bordo and
Meissner, 2011; Schularick and Steger, 2010), as well as research focusing on more recent
time periods (e.g., Calvo, 1998; Reinhart and Reinhart, 2008).
The global economy in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries “has often
been regarded as a very close approximation to a classical economic system [in which]
. . . capital flowed internationally to where it received the highest return” (Cottrell,
1975, p. 28). Previous studies of capital flows during this period have either used
measures of total capital flows or differentiated between capital flows to railways, gov-
ernments, and non-railway private sector industries. But these approaches do not take
into account the significant connections between protected sectors and governments in
emerging economies. The analysis in this chapter suggests that these connections played
a significant role in the financial crises that occurred in emerging economies from 1880-
1913.
Government-supported firms in this period were analogous to “Too Big to Fail”
firms today. This resulted in moral hazard issues on the part of private foreign in-
vestors. Governments were also implicated in the problems that arose due to these
issues. The evidence suggests a “diabolic loop” relationship between governments and
government-supported industries, as each sector undermined the stability of the other.
39
Foreign capital inflows to government-supported industries encouraged and exacerbated
these dynamics, and were significantly associated with financial crises at the turn of the
century.
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CHAPTER 2
RECOVERY FROM FINANCIAL CRISES IN PERIPHERAL
ECONOMIES, 1870-1913
“To excuse an indifference towards the control of depressions because the
latter are always followed by revival is, indeed, tantamount to saying that
we should not seek to abolish or lessen wars because they, too, are always
followed by a period of peace.” Paul Douglas (U.S. Senator and economist)
(1935, pp. 80-81)
2.1 Introduction
The 2007-08 financial crisis generated renewed interest in the factors that cause
financial crises. But as more time has passed, attention has turned toward recoveries
from crises. Since developed countries did not experience many crises over the second
half of the twentieth century, this line of research has had to reach further back into
history to times of greater macroeconomic turbulence to investigate a larger sample of
recovery periods.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2014), for example, present a comprehensive overview of the
available historical data on recoveries from financial crises. They measure the number of
years for business cycle peaks-to-troughs and peaks-to-recoveries over 100 crisis periods
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from 1857-2013.1 Other long-run and historical studies of recoveries from financial crises
tend to be more narrowly focused on specific periods, especially the Great Depression.2
In this chapter I focus on the 1870-1913 period, which saw an especially large number
of crises. Several previous studies are particularly relevant for the task at hand. Em-
pirically, I follow da Rocha and Solomou (2015) and Romer and Romer (2016) by using
Jordà’s (2005) local projection method to analyze post-crisis recovery periods. Specifi-
cally, I test the impact that terms of trade3 and tariff4 shocks have on economic output
in post-crisis periods.
Improving terms of trade have been connected with higher GDP levels and growth
rates.5 This could occur through a capital accumulation channel (Blattman, Hwang,
and Williamson, 2007), or through productivity improvements due to the ability to
import more productivity-enhancing capital goods (Basu and McLeod, 1992). In the
long run, however, investment could be tempered by a “resource curse” effect (Sachs
and Warner, 1995, 2001), or rent-seeking behavior among resource rich elites (Krueger,
1974). Blattman et al. (2007) contribute to this research by distinguishing between terms
1Related studies of the recoveries from financial crises include Baldacci, Gupta, and Mulas-Granados
(2009), Fatás and Mihov (2013), Ha and Kang (2015), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a, 2009b). Also see
the research on whether recoveries occur as “Phoenix Miracles” (when recoveries happen without a
reliance on credit): Calvo, Izquierdo, and Talvi (2006), Biggs, Mayer, and Pick (2010). Additionally,
Brunnermeier and Schabel (2016) study 400 years of bubbles, crises, and recoveries, looking at central
banks’ roles through each of these business cycle phases.
2Economic studies of the interwar period are too numerous to cite here in full, but several recent
studies that focus on recovery during the 1930s include Eggertsson (2012), Payne and Uren (2014), Jalil
and Rua (2016), Taylor and Neumann (2016), Chouliarakis and Gwiazdowski (2017), and Hausman,
Rhode, and Wieland (2017). A contemporary study focusing on the question of recovery at this time
is Brown et al. (1968 [1934]).
3Terms of trade is the ratio of export to import prices. See Section 4 for details.
4Tariff rates are measured as total government revenue from imports over the value of imports to a
given country in a given year. See Section 4 for details.
5Blattman et al. (2007, p. 160) present a useful overview of this literature.
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of trade growth and volatility.6 They find a significant negative relationship between
terms of trade volatility and economic growth in peripheral countries from 1870-1939,
versus no significant relationship between terms of trade growth and income growth.
Their approach is based on medium- to long-run time frames (2007, p. 168). Research
looking at the relationship between terms of trade movements and economic growth in
recent decades also takes a longer-run approach (Easterly et al., 1993; Rodrik, 1999;
Berg, Ostry, and Zettelmeyer, 2012). In contrast, I focus on the more immediate effects
that terms of trade movements can have on output, particularly during the several years
after financial crises.7
The 1870-1913 period is known as the “first era of globalization” for its high lev-
els of international capital, labor, and trade movements. This period is also notable
for the numerous and severe financial crises that occurred. While the interwar period
brought increased government involvement in directing economic activity, the pre-World
War I period was much more laissez-faire. Overt management of economies by national
governments was negligible, with tariff policies being one of the few government inter-
ventions in peripheral economies.8 To address the question of which factors played a
more significant role in helping economies recover from crises, terms of trade measures
and tariff rates are the best available data we have for comparing whether changes in
market conditions (commodity prices accounted for by terms of trade measures) or gov-
6Blattman et al. (2007, p. 166) use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to calculate these two factors,
terms of trade growth (a smooth trend) and volatility (stationary deviations).
7Some other studies, such as Funke, Granziera, and Imam (2008), use annual data in their analysis
of how terms of trade shocks impacted economic growth from 1970-2006, but as far as I know this is
the first study to use annual data to specifically focus on post-crisis periods for the 1870-1913 period.
8This “laissez-faire” narrative is challenged by research looking at the scale of both national and
local government involvement in shaping economic outcomes during this period (Novak, 1996, 2008;
Palen, 2015).
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ernment actions (specifically tariff policies) had more of an impact on GDP growth in
the wake of financial crises.
One of the few measurable factors that affected the severity of economic downturns
at this time was a country’s terms of trade. This was noted in early studies of this
period. Argentina’s recovery after the 1890 Baring Crisis, for example, was prolonged
in part because of depressed commodity prices (Ford, 1956), and recovery in the United
States after the 1893 panic was boosted when commodity prices increased in 1897 (after
a double-dip recession occurred in 1896) (White, 1939). Terms of trade data allow these
relationships between commodity price movements and broader economic recovery after
crises to be tested across peripheral economies over this period.
Tariff policy was one of the main avenues through which national governments could
impact economic outcomes at this time. In the United States, for example, one of the
main protectionist arguments in the 1890s was that higher tariff rates would promote
recovery from the 1893 panic and subsequent depression by assuring producers of both
agricultural and manufactured goods that they would benefit under a newly protectionist
regime (Bent 2015a, 2015b). There is an extensive literature on tariff rates and economic
growth more broadly for this period, with the general finding that higher tariffs were
associated with higher economic growth rates, at least before the mid-twentieth cen-
tury (O’Rourke, 2000; Clemens and Williamson, 2004b; Lehmann and O’Rourke, 2011;
Lampe and Sharpe, 2013), though the direction of causation is not always clear (Irwin,
2002a, 2002b). This chapter contributes to this literature by focusing on the relationship
between tariffs and growth specifically during post-crisis periods, to test protectionists’
claims that higher tariff rates would stabilize expectations and promote investment and
growth after crises.
The cross-country analysis in this chapter tests for the impact that terms of change
movements and tariff rates had on economic growth during the globally interconnected
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and macroeconomically volatile 1870-1913 period. The main empirical finding is that
tariff rate shocks had a significant positive impact on GDP growth in post-crisis periods,
whereas terms of trade shocks had a slightly negative impact. The tariff results are
especially pronounced in temperate economies, whereas the terms of trade results are
more of a feature of tropical economies. Altogether this adds to our understanding
of how economies recover from financial crises. I conclude that recoveries, especially
in the more developed peripheral economies, were due more to government action (at
least partly intended to improve macroeconomic performance) than to exogenous market
forces.
2.2 Terms of trade and economic growth
The countries included in this study had largely agricultural economies, which tended
to be dominated by a few commodities whose price movements could have broader
macroeconomic effects. Describing these trends for the United States at the turn of the
twentieth century, the economist A. Piatt Andrew made the following remarks:
An unusually large harvest in this country, if accompanied by small har-
vests abroad, obviously means prosperity for the American farmers, means
large exports and high prices, tends to mean incoming gold and expand-
ing credit. But, if accompanied by excessive crops abroad and flagging de-
mand, it means, on the other hand, extraordinarily low prices, diminished
exports, and depression in agriculture, if not in general trade (1906, p. 329).
. . . [T]he beginnings of every movement toward business prosperity and the
turning-points toward every business decline . . . were closely connected with
the out-turn of crops (ibid., p. 351).
What was true for the United States and other developing economies a hundred
years ago remains relevant for developing countries today. The long-run connections
between commodity price fluctuations and sovereign defaults are illustrated in Reinhart,
Reinhart, and Trebesch (2016), with data on boom-bust cycles over the past 200 years.
These relationships were relevant during the 2007-08 crisis (Shelburne, 2010; Bloch and
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Sapsford, 2011) just as they were for crises at the turn of the last century (Andrew,
1906; Davis, Hanes, and Rhode, 2009).
Terms of trade movements have been associated with changes in economic output
and growth more generally. Basu and McLeod (1992), for example, find long-run effects
on output for even short-term export price shocks. Similarly, terms of trade shocks help
explain differences in growth trajectories across countries, beyond what can be deter-
mined by country characteristics such as education levels (Easterly, Kremer, Pritchett,
and Summers, 1993).9 That such shocks have different effects in different countries has
also been documented in specific African cases by Deaton (1999), Imam and Salinas
(2008), and Fosu (2011).
Methodologically, it has been found that analyzing the impact of terms of trade
growth and volatility separately makes a difference for explaining the impact of terms
of trade movements on economic growth. Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson (2007), for
example, find a negative relationship between terms of trade volatility and output from
1870-1939, but no significant relationship between terms of trade growth and economic
output. Turnovsky and Chattopadhyay (2003) find similar results for the last quarter
of the twentieth century. Relatedly, Basu and McLeod (1992) find that export price
volatility decreases domestic investment. More narrowly, Bidarkota and Crucini (2000)
highlight the importance of accounting for particular commodities when studying terms
of trade volatility in developing countries.
Of the different types of shocks developing countries can experience, Becker and
Mauro (2006) find negative terms of trade shocks to have the most severe impact on eco-
9Hadass and Williamson (2003, p. 651) suggest otherwise, in their long-run empirical analysis of
the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis: “It appears that the great terms-of-trade debate was about an event
that was pretty minor for most participants in the center and the periphery. The fundamentals inside
these countries mattered most to growth, just as they do today.” While that accounts for the long-run
relationship between terms of trade and economic growth, the analysis in this chapter focuses more
narrowly on terms of trade changes in the aftermath of financial crises.
46
nomic output. Rodrik (1999) and Jerzmanowski (2006) argue that institutions explain
much of a country’s ability to recover from such shocks.10 Similarly, Funke, Granziera,
and Imam (2008) study the role that particular institutional variables play in recovery
periods from 1970-2006. The same range of variables is not available for the 1870-1913
period, but they would be less relevant, since national governments in general did not
take as active a role in shaping their country’s economies, and estimates of institu-
tional quality would be less informative. My approach is to assess the overall impact
that terms of trade shocks had on economies in post-crisis periods in order to see what
factors contributed to, or hindered, recoveries from financial crises at this time.
2.3 Tariffs and economic growth
While national governments in developing countries mostly took a hands-off approach
to their economies over the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, tariff policies
were one of the few ways they directly impacted economic activity. Tariffs can spur
economic growth by supporting development through infant industry protection (List,
1909[1841]; Amsden, 1989).11 In the late nineteenth century, tariffs were also a main
source of government revenue, and balancing the budget was a stated aim of protection-
ists.12 Additionally, the case of the United States during the 1890s depression suggests
10Rodrik (1999) uses indicators of the quality of governmental institutions, rule of law, democratic
rights, and social safety nets as proxies for institutions of conflict management. Jerzmanowski (2006, p.
366) measures institutional quality with an index based on measures of rule of law, risk of expropriation,
corruption, bureaucratic quality, and government repudiation contracts.
11Allen (2011) presents a useful overview of different countries’ experiences with protectionism
through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
12E.g., for Republicans in the United States.
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that decisive increases in tariff rates in the wake of financial crises can signal that the
government is willing to protect the domestic economy from foreign competition.13
Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000, pp. 267-68) summarize contemporary theories about
the impact trade restrictions have on real GDP. In discussing static models with no
market imperfections, neoclassical growth models, and endogenous growth models, they
note that “there should be no theoretical presumption in favor of finding an unam-
biguous, negative relationship between trade barriers and growth rates in the types of
cross-national data sets typically analyzed” (ibid., p. 268). These theories also allow
for short and long term positive connections between protectionist policies and GDP
growth, such as when import-competing sectors have positive production externalities,
or when technologically dynamic industries are promoted more strongly in endogenous
growth models (ibid).
Empirical studies spanning the 1870-1913 period have analyzed the connections be-
tween average measures of protection and economic growth (O’Rourke, 2000; Vam-
vakidis, 2002; Clemens and Williamson, 2004b; Schularick and Solomou, 2011, Jacks,
2013). A more extensive literature addresses this issue for recent decades.14 While
early studies (O’Rourke, 2000; Clemens and Williamson, 2004b) found that the over-
all relationship between tariffs and growth was positive for the late nineteenth century,
increasingly the evidence suggests that this relationship is “complex, time-varying and
may display significant heterogeneity” (Schularick and Solomou, 2011, p. 35). Lehmann
and O’Rourke (2011) build on this research by exploring the connections between var-
ious types of tariffs—agricultural, industrial, or revenue (luxury goods)—based on the
13Disentangling the stated goal of promoting national prosperity from unstated goals of aiding specific
interest groups through tariff policies is difficult (Stern, 1971, p. viii; Bent, 2015a).
14There are many overviews of this literature available. Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000) is a useful, if
slightly dated, starting point. Schularick and Solomou (2011) present a more recent discussion of this
literature, covering both historical and more recent periods.
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premise that different countries imported different commodities, and that average tariff
rates hide important differences across sectors.
These studies use panel data to analyze broad trends across countries. In contrast,
Lampe and Sharp (2013) use time series methods to explore the connections between
changes in tariff rates and economic growth on a country-by-country basis, addressing
the importance of cross-country heterogeneity as highlighted by Schularick and Solomou
(2011). In contrast to earlier panel data studies, Lampe and Sharp (2013) find that while
the relationship between tariffs and income differed by country, for most countries the
overall relationship between tariffs and income was negative. Other research has focused
on individual countries, such as a recent study of turn-of-the-century Switzerland. For
the Swiss case, Charles (2017) finds that “moderate and selective” protectionism from
1886-1913 “Granger-causes” increased exports from new industries.
Supporting the use of such case studies is Irwin’s (2002b) argument that cross-country
analyses of tariffs and growth have significant limitations. Irwin argues that for cross-
country studies focused on this period, results showing positive correlation between high
tariffs and high growth can be driven by countries such as Argentina and Canada, which
had economies based on export crops rather than import-substitution industrialization.
Irwin concludes that “[r]ather than higher tariffs causing higher growth, the relationship
could be spurious: land-abundant countries relied on customs duties to raise government
revenue and also enjoyed favorable growth prospects, with little link between the two”
(Irwin, 2002b, p. 169). This is a useful critique of the existing literature, and one that
I address in Chapter 3 below, employing detailed case studies to complement cross-
country empirical analyses. Also, it is important to note that by focusing here on
post-crisis periods, I do not address long-run trends, but rather look more narrowly at
the short-run impact of tariff shocks in the context of post-crisis economic downturns.
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The goal of this analysis is not to make new claims about the overall connections
between trade openness and economic growth across this whole period, whether mostly
positive, negative, or heterogeneous across different countries. Instead, I address the
observation that this relationship could be time-varying (Schularick and Solomou, 2011),
which, I argue, is especially important to recognize with regard to how tariff policy
impacted economies in the aftermath of financial crises.
A final question about tariffs is whether tariff rate changes can be accurately de-
scribed as exogenous shocks. Terms of trade shocks, for example, can occur when a nat-
ural disaster significantly impacts the price of an export commodity. In contrast, tariff
changes are more likely to be anticipated, as they are determined politically (Williamson,
2006, p. 199). Still, the empirical literature on trade restrictions accounts for tar-
iff “shocks” as well as gradual changes in tariff rates (Auernheimer and George, 1997;
Malakellis, 1998). Sometimes governments deliberately phase in tariffs gradually in or-
der to reduce the shock effect (Irwin, 2014, p. 8). While some tariff policy changes are
anticipated and/or gradual, treating tariff changes as shocks is common practice in the
empirical trade literature (Lanclos and Hertel, 1995; Spearot, 2016).
2.4 Data and framework
The main variables used in this study are terms of trade, tariff rates, and GDP
estimates covering 35 countries for the years 1870-1913. The terms of trade data come
from Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson’s (2007) database15 and the tariff rate data are
from Clemens and Williamson (2004b). Terms of trade is the ratio of export to import
prices, and tariff rates are calculated as total government revenue from imports over the
15The terms of trade data are constructed by Blattman et al. (2007, p. 163) from commodity price
series. I am grateful to Jeffrey Williamson for sharing an updated version of this database with me
(September 2016).
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value of imports to that country in that year. The GDP series from the Blattman et al.
database are mostly from Maddison (1995) but are supplemented with other data series
when available.
The other main variables of interest are financial crisis indicators. For this time
period, the available measures of financial crises are binary variables, equaling one if a
crisis occurred in a particular country in a given year, and zero otherwise. There are data
for banking crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009b), currency crises (Bordo and Meissner,
2011), and sovereign defaults (Suter, 1990) (see table B.1 in the data appendix).16 For
the sovereign default data, I focus on the first year of default periods in order to isolate
the onset of an actual crisis rather than accounting for prolonged default episodes. In
order to have a sufficiently large sample of recovery periods, I focus on recoveries from
each of these crisis types together. That is, I code the crisis data as an encompassing
measure of whether any type of crisis—banking, currency, or default—occurred in a
country-year observation, and then test how terms of trade and tariff shocks impacted
GDP in those post-crisis periods.17
Previous studies of the relationship between terms of trade measures and economic
growth use five- or ten-year averages in order to account for long-run trends (Hadass
and Williamson, 2003; Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson, 2007). The same is true for
studies of connections between tariff rates and GDP growth over this period (Lehmann
and O’Rourke, 2011; O’Rourke, 2000; Lampe and Sharpe, 2013). In contrast, I am
16The currency crisis data begin in 1880. An updated version of Suter’s book was published in English
in 1992.
17In the robustness section I focus on specific types of crises separately.
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interested in the short-run impact of terms of trade and tariff shocks specifically in
post-crisis contexts. I thus use annual data.18
The empirical analysis below focuses on the five-year period after a financial crisis.
This timeframe was selected in order to cover both the immediate aftermath of crises
and the chances for renewed economic growth as economies began to recover from crises.
Extending the timeframe further than five years out from a crisis would move toward
the types of long-run studies of terms of trade and economic growth that have already
been undertaken (e.g., Blattman et al., 2007). The goal of this analysis is more narrow,
asking how terms of trade and tariff movements impacted economies specifically as
they recovered from financial crises. The definition of recoveries from financial crises is
essentially uniform across the existing literature. Bordo and Meissner (2016, pp. 40-41),
for example, define recovery as “the number of years until the level of real GDP per
capita attains the prior peak it reached.” Such peak-to-trough-to-peak frameworks are
also adopted by Reinhart and Rogoff (2014), Bivens (2016), and others. In their study
of recoveries from 100 banking crises, Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) measure the peaks,
troughs, and first years that exceed the prior peak in their GDP per capita data. They
calculate the years to full level recovery (the number of years from peak to new peak)
for each of the 100 crises in their sample.19 For the years 1870-1915 there were 18 crisis
periods, which averaged 4.94 years peak-to-peak.20
18There are shortcomings to this approach, due to the imprecision of the data. The export and import
data that are used to construct the terms of trade ratio are difficult to find for all countries and years
in this sample. The tariff data face similar limitations. When interpolation was used to fill in gaps in
these data series, this could smooth over more volatile annual variation. See the original papers for
which these data were developed in order to see the details of when and how interpolation was used in
constructing the data: Clemens and Williamson (2004b); Blattman et al. (2007).
19Gadea Rivas, Gómez-Loscos, and Pérez-Quirós (2017) propose new measures of recoveries, looking
at short-run (first few quarters), medium-run, and long-run features of recoveries separately.
20This excludes three extreme outliers: cases in Australia, Brazil, and Uruguay over this period where
the peak-to-peak cycle lasted an average of 20 years.
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A final point about the sample used in this analysis concerns the distinction between
“core” and “peripheral” countries. There are terms of trade, GDP, and financial crisis
data available for Britain, France, and Germany, which I designate as core countries.
I exclude these countries from this sample, in order to focus on peripheral countries,
or what today might be called “developing” economies. Blattman et al. (2007) also
include Austria-Hungary and the United States in their subsample of core countries, but
their analysis extends through 1939. For much of my sample period, the United States
was a net capital importer, making it more similar in that regard to Argentina than to
Britain, for example. Another factor that influences the core versus periphery distinction
for Blattman et al. (2007) is whether an economy was large enough to influence global
prices for a particular commodity, and whether a country exported manufactures. The
United States poses a problem on both these counts, so it is excluded from some of the
econometric tests below to check that it is not unduly influencing the main results.
2.5 Empirical analysis
2.5.1 General trends
Before econometrically testing for the relationship between terms of trade and tariff
shocks and economic growth, the general trends for these variables are presented in
table 2.1.
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Table 2.1: Changes in terms of trade and tariffs, 1870-1913
Variable 1870-1913 Pre-crisis Post-crisis
GDP 36.05 61.05 47.94
∆ GDP 0.82 2.13 0.96
Terms of trade 112.61 113.71 111.06
∆ Terms of trade 0.03 0.58 0.44
Tariff 16.55 18.17 19.83
∆ Tariff 0.05 -0.10 -0.02
Note: The first column shows the average value of each
variable over the entire sample period (1870-1913), the sec-
ond column shows the average value over the five years lead-
ing up to crises, and the third column shows the average
value over the five years after a crisis. The GDP data are
in millions of 1990 dollars. Beneath the main row for each
variable is the average annual change over each period.
Sources: The GDP data are from Blattman et al. (2007),
mostly based on Maddison (1995). The terms of trade
data come from Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson’s (2007)
database, and the tariff rate data are from Clemens and
Williamson (2004b).
GDP declines substantially after a crisis, both in levels and rates. The GDP data also
suggest a boom-bust pattern, with higher than average growth before crises, followed by
lower than average growth. The same is true for terms of trade, except the change in
terms of trade over post-crisis periods is higher than the change in terms of trade over
the whole sample. But this fits with the overall trajectory of the average terms of trade
index across these countries from 1870-1913, because even though the index rose in the
1880s and fell in the 1890s, these peaks and troughs average out to little change over
the whole period. In contrast, tariff rates were on average higher in post-crisis periods
compared to pre-crisis periods and the sample average.
2.5.2 Econometric methodology
I use Jordà’s (2005) local projection method to study the reaction of economies to
terms of trade and tariff rate shocks. This technique has been used to address similar
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questions in recent research. Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013), for example, use
this method to study government spending multipliers. Romer and Romer (2016) and
da Rocha and Solomou (2015) and use variations of this estimation method to study
the impact that financial crises had on economic output. While Lampe and Sharp’s
(2013) analysis has the benefit of looking at individual countries’ experiences, the focus
on recovery periods in this chapter is worth studying at the more aggregate level of
peripheral countries in a panel setting, to see if there are cross-country trends for these
factors (terms of trade and tariffs) in this context (post-crisis periods).
Jordà’s (2005) local projection method generates an impulse response of GDP to
terms of trade and tariff shocks, based on the coefficient estimates from a sequence
of regressions. The baseline version of the model used here is based on the Ramey
and Zubairy (2014), da Rocha and Solomou (2015), and Romer and Romer (2016)
adaptations of Jordà’s method:
yi,t+h
yi,t−1
= βh1ToT i,t + βh2Tariff i,t + βh3Posti,t + βh4Post*ToT i,t + βh5Post*Tariff i,t +
θDi,t−1 + ei,t+h (1)
where the dependent variable is cumulative GDP growth, ToT is terms of trade, and
Tariff is the tariff rate. The terms of trade and tariff rate variables are also interacted
with the post-crisis dummy (Post, which indicates if it is years one through five after a fi-
nancial crisis). D is the lagged dependent variable.21 The t subscript denotes time, while
h represents the amount of time (up to five years) after t in that particular regression.
The interaction terms are used to generate the impulse responses for the post-crisis
periods. This isolates the impact that the variables of interest (terms of trade or tariffs)
had on economic growth specifically during the aftermath of financial crises.
21One lag is used, based on standard lag specification tests.
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2.5.3 Results and discussion
Plotting the coefficient estimates from equation 1 shows the impulse response of
GDP to a shock in the independent variable of interest–terms of trade and tariffs–for
post-crisis periods, along with 95 percent confidence intervals.
A terms of trade shock (figure 2.1, panel a) has a negative impact on GDP over
post-crisis periods (though the results are only statistically significant several years out
from the shock). In contrast, tariff shocks (figure 2.1, panel b) have a positive impact on
GDP during post-crisis periods (though the results are only significant during the first
couple of years after a shock).
Figure 2.1: Response of real GDP to terms of trade and tariff shocks
(a) Terms of trade (b) Tariff
Notes: The graphs show the impulse response function of real GDP to an impulse of
terms of trade and tariffs from estimating equation 1, along with 95 percent confidence
bands.
Interpreting the results when interaction terms are included is easier after the marginal
effects are calculated (see table 2.2). The trends in the marginal effects are the same as
for the estimates from the baseline model—terms of trade have an increasingly negative
association with GDP, while tariffs have an increasingly positive relationship. One year
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out from the beginning of a crisis, for example, a terms of trade shock has a negative 0.1
percent impact on output growth, and a tariff shock has a positive 6.1 percent impact
on output growth. The further away from the crisis the harder it is to draw a direct con-
nection between the independent and dependent variables, but the signs of the overall
trends for each variable are strongly suggestive.
Table 2.2: Marginal effects
Variable Post-crisis year Marginal effect
Terms of trade 0 -0.011
1 -0.001
2 -0.007
3 -0.083
4 -0.137
5 -0.213
Tariff 0 0.028
1 0.061
2 0.094
3 0.127
4 0.168
5 0.217
These results address competing claims in the literature on recovery from financial
crises at the turn of the twentieth century. Earlier studies emphasized the role that
export prices played in propelling economic recoveries over this period. White (1939)
and Ford (1956), for example, analyze specific crises and argue that depressed commodity
prices prolonged depressions and increasing prices helped economies recover. And in the
turn-of-the-century United States, protectionists argued that higher tariff rates would
help stabilize the economy after panics. The analysis in this chapter addresses these
claims in an international context over the whole 1870-1913 period.
The terms of trade results align with the finding from Blattman et al. (2007) that
the terms of trade variable itself was not significantly associated with GDP growth over
this period. When they break down terms of trade into separate growth and volatility
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measures they find a significant negative relationship between terms of trade volatility
and GDP growth, but no significant relationship between terms of trade growth and
GDP. Those measures of growth and volatility are derived from data spanning the whole
sample, which would not make sense in the short-run context of post-crisis periods. The
impulse responses show the impact of a shock in the first and subsequent years after
a crisis. These post-crisis terms of trade results complement the findings of Blattman
et al., by suggesting that a terms of trade shock had a significant negative effect on
GDP after a financial crisis, corresponding to their negative finding for terms of trade
volatility overall.
The tariff results align with theories that suggest the short-term impact of tariffs
would be positive (by protecting domestic industry and encouraging investment) but
that the long-run impact would be negative (as firms grew complacent and inefficient as
a result of being protected from competition, for example, and/or through deadweight
losses).22 Additionally, there are particular short-run concerns that are heightened in the
aftermath of crises, namely the desire to promote stability and manage expectations by
assuring firms and investors that the government has a plan for what trade policies will
be implemented. As the mayor of New York City complained in 1897, it is “constant and
repeated changes [in tariff rates] that unsettle the business of this country” (“Dingley
Bill Discussed”). Tariff policies were one of the few options available for governments in
these developing countries to intervene in their economies at this time, and this evidence
suggests that such policies were associated with renewed output growth after financial
crises.
Looking in greater depth at the factors driving these results, it is also important
to acknowledge that different countries produced different types of exports. Terms of
22See Bastiat (2007 [1850], pp. 24-29) for a useful historical illustration of the longer-run negative
effects of tariffs.
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trade fluctuations could thus impact certain sub-samples of countries differently based
on whether they were exporting particular commodities at a given time. Countries’ re-
sources and commodity production could be determined by factors such as geography,
chance, or institutions, and later stages of development could be impacted by which
commodities were produced in a country. Díaz Alejandro (1984) dubs this the “com-
modity lottery” (see also Blattman et al. 2007, p. 160). Similarly, Lewis (1978a, pp.
14-20) highlights the differences between the terms of trade in temperate versus tropical
countries, focusing on price differences between temperate and tropical commodities,
and how they influenced wages, immigration, and overall development.23
To test whether Lewis’s distinction between temperate and tropical countries made
a difference for how countries recovered from financial crises, the same local projec-
tion method is used as for the baseline analysis (equation 1), but the sample is divided
into temperate and tropical countries, trying several variations of these categories. One
broad way to categorize the countries in this sample is a temperate versus tropical dis-
tinction based on whether countries were temperate grain producers or producers of
tropical commodities (Lewis, 1978b, p. 188; Lewis, 1978a, p. 14; these distinctions
generally fit with standard geographical definitions of temperate versus tropical regions,
based on distance from the equator). Under these guidelines, the temperate countries
include those in the European periphery, regions of recent settlement, and the South-
ern Cone countries of South America: Argentina, Australia, Austria-Hungary, Canada,
Chile, Denmark, Greece, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Spain,
Sweden, Turkey, United States, Uruguay. I classify the rest of the countries in the sample
as tropical: Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia,
23An important factor in Lewis’s analysis is the temperate versus tropical country wage differential.
Temperate countries produced commodities which had prices high enough to attract European immi-
grants, versus tropical countries which produced commodities whose production paid low wages, due to
low productivity in domestic agriculture (Lewis, 1978a, p. 14).
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Japan, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Thailand. The results of this analysis are shown in
figure 2.2.24
Figure 2.2: Temperate vs. tropical countries: local projection results
(a) Temperate: terms of trade (b) Temperate: tariff
(c) Tropical: terms of trade (d) Tropical: tariff
Notes: The graphs show the impulse response function of real GDP to an impulse of
terms of trade and tariffs from estimating equation 1, along with 95 percent confidence
bands. See text for definitions of temperate and tropical countries.
These results suggest that there were significant differences between these two groups
of countries. Panels a and b indicate that terms of trade shocks did not impact temperate
countries’ output after financial crises, but tariff shocks did have a positive and significant
24Average tariff and terms of trade estimates for each group (tropical and temperate countries) are
shown in figure B.1 in the data appendix. Lewis (1978a, p. 14) differentiates more narrowly among
“new countries of temperate settlement” (Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, New Zealand, and South
Africa), the United States, and other (tropical) destinations for European migrants. Lewis (1978b, p.
160) explicitly identifies “India, Ceylon, Indonesia, Egypt, Brazil, and other Latin American countries”
as being tropical.
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effect. In contrast, for tropical countries (panels c and d) tariff shocks did not have a
significant effect, but terms of trade shocks had a negative association with growth during
post-crisis periods.25 Each of these outcomes is reasonable, since the temperate countries
include more developed economies and governments which could implement potentially
more effective policy responses to crises, and more volatile terms of trade could have a
more significant negative impact on less developed tropical countries than on temperate
countries if tropical countries were more reliant on one or two export commodities (had
less diversified economies) and had less government capacity to cope with crises.26
Jacks’s (2013) real commodity price data also align with these trends, as tropical
commodities (such as cocoa and coffee) often experienced more booms and busts than
temperate commodities (such as wheat and wool) over this period. Price indices for
select commodities are shown in figure 2.3. Both sets of price series are volatile, but
temperate commodity prices follow a loosely U-shaped trajectory centered around a
trough in the mid-1890s (panel a). In contrast, for tropical commodities, sugar exhibits
an overall declining trend, while coffee prices had more sustained highs and lows, and
cocoa fluctuated widely with no clear trend. The generally falling commodity prices in
tropical countries (at least for sugar and cocoa) fit with Lewis’s thesis as well as with
the econometric findings above, highlighting how negative terms of trade trends had
more of an adverse effect on economic growth in tropical countries than in temperate
countries. Declining terms of trade in tropical countries over this period also can be seen
in figure B.1 (panel c) in the data appendix.
25Both temperate and tropical countries had increases in average tariff rates during post-crisis periods
compared to pre-crisis periods. Average pre-crisis tariff rates in tropical economies were 18.19, and
average post-crisis tariff rates in those economies were 21.15. For temperate economies, the pre- and
post-crisis average tariff rates were 18.16 and 19.05, respectively.
26Colonial status is not taken directly into account in this analysis, but it influenced which crops were
grown and what trade policies were implemented, among other factors affecting many of the economies
in this sample (Clemens and Williamson, 2002). But Williamson (2006, p. 204) argues that “while
colonial tariff policy did indeed mimic that of their masters, local conditions mattered as well.”
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Figure 2.3: Commodity prices: temperate vs. tropical, 1870-1913
(a) Temperate (b) Tropical
Notes: These figures show the changes in selected commodity prices. Panel (a) shows com-
modities from generally temperate countries, while panel (b) shows commodities from tropical
countries.
Source: Jacks (2013).
2.5.4 Additional tests and specifications
One potential issue with this empirical strategy is that the results found for the
post-crisis periods could simply be a consequence of looking at five-year periods rather
than all the years in the sample. To be assured that this is not the case, I run the
main regressions again but replace the post-crisis indicator in equation 1 with a dummy
variable for the five years preceding a crisis. The results for the pre-crisis period are very
different, with the tariff interaction results negative and insignificant. This suggests
that the relationships between terms of trade and output growth and between tariffs
and output growth were different during the pre- versus post-crisis periods, with tariffs
having an especially strong impact on crises in the post-crisis periods.
Similarly, it is important to determine whether the choice of five-year post-crisis
periods (rather than a longer time frame) is driving the results. To be assured that this
is not the case, I ran the sequence of regressions from equation 1 but with the interaction
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post-crisis dummy variable spanning ten rather than five years, and this confirmed that
a five-year horizon is a reasonable focus for this analysis.27 After six years, the results for
both terms of trade and tariff shocks are no longer consistently statistically significant.
This suggests that these shocks had the strongest impact in the short-to-medium term
after a crisis, and that the effect dissipated as more time passed.
Ideally this analysis would also take into account the duration and severity of crises.
Not all crises have the same impact; sometimes GDP per capita is higher the year after
a financial crisis, and sometimes it remains depressed for years. Reinhart and Rogoff
(2014) account for these differences by developing a “crisis severity index.” Their index
is calculated as:
Severity indexi = −(Peak to trough % change) +
(Number of years from peak to recovery of prior peaki). (2)
That index accounts for 100 crisis episodes, each denoted by the i subscript in equation
2, over more than 150 years and a wide range of countries. Combined with peak-to-
trough and peak-to-recovery timelines and an indicator of whether or not there was a
double-dip, the index offers a way to compare recovery periods across different countries
and times. Incorporating such an index into the analysis in this chapter would be useful
because, for example, it would provide information about whether terms of trade or tariff
shocks coincided with mild or severe crises. Unfortunately, the sample in this study is
too limited to undertake that kind of analysis. There are 37 banking banking crises in
my sample, and in only 12 of those cases did post-crisis GDP per capita decrease for one
or more years. In future research, extended series of terms of trade and tariff rate data
could be combined with Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2014) crisis severity index to conduct a
longer-run study of interactions between those variables.
27The results are shown in figure B.2 in the appendix.
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I also account for the possibility that recoveries could be different depending on the
type of crisis that an economy experienced. The financial crisis measure used in the
baseline regressions is a binary indicator of whether any type of crisis occurred, and
that measure is based on individual dummy variables for banking, currency, or sovereign
debt crises. To test whether recoveries differed depending on the type of crisis involved,
I ran the regressions from equation 1 but focusing on each crisis category separately.28
It is clear from those regressions that banking crises are driving the main results, with
terms of trade having a negative and significant impact on GDP after crises, and tariffs
having a bigger, positive impact.29 Future research can explore what is unique about
the recoveries from banking crises in particular that led to these results.
Additionally, I run different econometric tests to be assured that the results are not
unduly driven by the choice of model. The OLS regressions in table 2.3 test the general
relationship between five-year averages of GDP per capita growth and the independent
variables: terms of trade and tariffs. Using five-year averages of the data follows standard
growth regression conventions. It also addresses the concern that the annual historical
data are imperfect (e.g., with interpolation used to estimate data for missing years),
so averaging captures broader trends. These regressions also include standard growth
regression variables such as initial per capita income, human capital, and population
growth measures, along with country and period fixed effects. Using GDP per capita
data here also serves as a robustness check for the baseline analysis which used GDP
data, by accounting for the population of each country.
28The results are shown in figure B.3 in the appendix.
29The currency crisis data only cover the years 1880-1913, so to be sure that the 1870s data were
not driving the banking crisis results I ran these regressions again for banking crises only during the
1880-1913 period. The main results still came through.
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Table 2.3: OLS regressions
Dependent variable:
GDP per capita growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Period: (Whole) (Post-crisis) (Whole) (Post-crisis) (Whole) (Post-crisis)
Terms of trade 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Terms of trade volatility -0.0006 -0.0013
(0.0005) (0.0013)
Terms of trade growth 0.0940* 0.2395
(0.0486) (0.1933)
Tariff 0.0003 0.0013* 0.0003 0.0014** 0.0004 0.0015*
(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0008)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 315 80 315 80 288 70
Number of countries 35 30 35 30 32 27
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables are lagged one period. Constant term is included
in the regressions but omitted from the table for brevity. Controls include logged initial GDP per capita, the proportion
of the population with primary schooling, and population growth. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Each pair of regressions in table 2.3 follows the same pattern: the first column of
each pair (1, 3, and 5) includes the whole sample period, and the second column of each
pair (2, 4, and 6) is limited to five-year periods that had 60 percent or more of the years
during that period identified as post-crisis years.30 Regressions 1 and 2 use the same
terms of trade and tariff measures as the baseline regressions, and the results suggest a
positive and significant association between tariffs and growth during post-crisis periods.
Regressions 3 and 4 follow Blattman et al. (2007) by using a Hodrick–Prescott filter to
isolate the volatility and growth components of terms of trade. Blattman et al. find
terms of trade volatility to be negatively and significantly associated with economic
growth in a similar set of countries from 1870-1939. They also find that while terms
30Just as with the baseline regressions, a post-crisis period is defined as the five years after the
beginning of a financial crisis. The data used in the table 2.3 regressions are averaged in five-year
intervals. The selected inclusion criterion in regressions 2, 4, and 6 is that 60 percent of the years in
each five-year period must be post-crisis years. If that criterion is set at 100 percent the sample is too
small to undertake this analysis. If it is set at 80 percent the signs of the results are the same, but the
tariff result is not significant.
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of trade growth was mostly positively associated with crises, that relationship was not
statistically significant. Regressions 3 and 4 in table 2.3 control for terms of trade
volatility and growth separately, following the analysis of Blattman et al., in case that
is an important part of explaining growth in post-crisis periods in particular. But that
does not appear to be the case. The results in regression 4 suggest that tariffs are still
more significantly associated with post-crisis growth than is any measure of terms of
trade changes.
Regressions 5 and 6 are the same as 1 and 2 but exclude Austria-Hungary, Italy, and
the United States, which Blattman et al. identify as part of the industrial core. The re-
sults are essentially unchanged, suggesting that the particular core-periphery distinction
adopted in this analysis is not what is driving the results. It could also be important
to differentiate between countries that were price-makers versus price-takers in global
commodity markets. Blattman et al. (2007, p. 169) identify Australia, Brazil, Chile,
China, India, the Philippines, and Russia as either (1) producing more than five percent
of world exports, or (2) accounting for more than one-third of the global exports of a
particular commodity. When these countries are dropped from the baseline OLS spec-
ifications (that used in columns 1 and 2 of table 2.3) the signs and magnitudes of the
post-crisis results are essentially unchanged but the tariff result is no longer significant.
But the sample size in that case is down to 64 observations and 24 groups, which could
be driving that particular result.
2.6 Investment channel
It would be informative to test how shocks to terms of trade and tariff rates in the
aftermath of financial crises impacted the investment decisions of agents in peripheral
economies. This could be a channel through which these factors impacted recoveries from
crises, as changes in terms of trade or tariff rates could make investment more (or less)
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attractive. Unfortunately, investment data are not available for this sample of countries
for 1870-1913.31 An imperfect substitute is data on capital inflows from Britain (Stone,
1999).32 Using these data, Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson (2007) find the same
negative relationship between British capital exports and terms of trade volatility as they
find for the connection between GDP growth and terms of trade volatility, suggesting
that countries with more volatile terms of trade were less attractive to foreign investors.
Also, using annual data and analyzing the “pull factors” that attracted capital flows to
peripheral economies over this period, Clemens and Williamson (2004a) find a positive
and significant association between tariff rates and capital inflows, indicating that more
protectionist trade regimes were attractive to foreign investors. For terms of trade their
results are also positive, but smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant.
I undertook a similar analysis using the framework developed in this chapter, with
capital inflows as the dependent variable (instead of GDP) in equation 1. The results
are inconclusive, but generally indicate that terms of trade or tariff shocks were not
significantly associated with capital inflows during post-crisis periods. Over five-year
post-crisis periods, the coefficient estimates for tariffs were generally positive and the
terms of trade results were negative, though the results were not consistently statistically
significant.33 I also disaggregated the capital inflow data into capital flows to govern-
ments and capital flows to private sector industries, and again the results suggest that
there is generally no significant relationship between terms of trade or tariffs and capital
inflows (of either type—government or private sector) during the five-year post-crisis
31Data on investment rates are available for later periods, such as from 1960 onward as presented
in the Penn World Tables, but unfortunately no comparable cross-country data exist for the pre-1913
period. The Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory Database has investment-to-GDP ratios for only a
subsample of the countries covered here.
32Data on capital exports from Germany and France are available from Esteves (2007) and Esteves
(2011, 2015), respectively, but only from the early 1880s onward.
33These results are shown in figure B.4 in the appendix.
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periods. In the longer run, capital inflows have been shown to be positively associated
with output growth (Bordo and Meissner, 2011). In contrast, the general trends of my
findings suggest that capital flows were not a major factor contributing to recoveries
from financial crises over this period.
A limitation of my analysis is that foreign capital inflows only account for a fraction of
investment in these peripheral economies at this time. Domestic investment was more
important for much of the business activity that was undertaken by farms and small
firms. A one-off commodity price boom could provide farmers, for example, with extra
money to invest in new equipment and expanded production or land acquisition (White,
1982, pp. 80-81). Similarly, firms could finance investment through retained earnings.
These avenues of domestic investment are not accounted for in the international capital
flow data.
The Jordà-Schularick-Taylor Macrohistory Database has investment-to-GDP ratios
for nine of the countries in this sample. Local projections (equation 1) using this sub-
sample and the investment-to-GDP ratio as the dependent variable yield generally in-
significant results. The same is the case when a measure of domestic investment is
generated by multiplying the investment-to-GDP ratio by GDP. But this subsample is
very limited, and mostly focuses on the richer/bigger economies from the sample, so I
do not place too much emphasis on these results. They do not convincingly rule out the
possibility that domestic investment increased as a result of terms of trade or tariff rate
changes. This analysis can be undertaken more satisfactorily in the future as additional
data on domestic investment become available for a larger sample of countries.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter addresses two related literatures that look at (1) the connection be-
tween terms of trade movements and economic growth, and (2) tariff rates and eco-
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nomic growth. While the relationship between terms of trade and GDP growth has
been clearly demonstrated (Blattman et al., 2007), finding a connection, if any, between
tariffs and growth has been more contentious. By focusing specifically on post-crisis
periods, the question addressed in this chapter is more narrow. For post-crisis periods,
I find a negative impact of terms of trade shocks, but a positive impact for tariff shocks.
This suggests that national governments played a more active role in shaping economic
outcomes than has often been appreciated for this period.
This period has traditionally been characterized as being the historical zenith of
laissez-faire capitalism. Focusing on the role of national governments in these economies
at this time challenges this narrative. A growing literature is developing this line of
research, finding more evidence for government actions in economies at the dawn of the
progressive era.34 The debates in the United States after the 1893 panic are a prominent
example of these trends.35 A Democratic presidency overlapped with the mid-1890s
depression and the implementation of more liberalized trade policies from 1894-97. This
allowed protectionist-minded Republicans to assert that free trade policies prolonged the
depression. They argued that protectionist policies would renew confidence in domestic
industry and balance the federal budget through increased tariff revenues. After the
Republican William McKinley assumed the presidency in 1897, tariff rates were raised
to some of the highest levels ever seen in the United States. In that same year, the
U.S. economy also began to recover from the mid-1890s depression (the most severe
depression through that point in U.S. history). This allowed protectionists to claim that
34See Palen (2015, p. 161) for a summary of the literature that frames the turn of the twentieth
century as being laissez-faire, as well as the research that refutes that characterization. See also Pollard
(1981, p. 252) for a discussion of government interference in trade from 1870-1914.
35A case study of this episode is developed in Chapter 3 below. See also Bent (2015a), where I look
more closely at the intentions behind trade policy at this time, especially in the context of financial
crises.
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their higher tariff rates were indeed effective for spurring output growth in the face of a
deep economic downturn.
The validity of those claims is explored elsewhere (Bent 2015a), but this episode
offers an example of the debates that were taking place at this time over the appropriate
role for policy action to deal with crises. This historical antecedent to the well-studied
policy actions taken during the Great Depression36 is under-appreciated, and shapes
a developing view of the “laissez-faire” turn of the twentieth century as actually hav-
ing more government involvement in shaping economies after financial crises than has
traditionally been recognized.
This chapter presents a broad cross-country analysis of the interactions between
governments and markets. Its findings suggest that trade policy changes were more
important than terms of trade shocks for explaining renewed economic growth after
financial crises during the globally-integrated 1870-1913 period. As Irwin (2002b) has
demonstrated, case studies of this issue can highlight shortcomings in broader cross-
country econometric studies. The third chapter of this dissertation provides case studies
of the United States and Argentina in the 1890s. Further research can look more closely
at other individual cases when terms of trade movements and tariff rate changes occurred
after crises. Future research can also explore the investment channel in greater depth as
more data become available for measuring domestic investment over this period.
36The literature on policy actions to combat the Great Depression is extensive and has been evolving
since the 1930s. A relatively recent overview of this literature is presented in Crafts and Fearon (2013).
70
CHAPTER 3
TERMS OF TRADE, TARIFF RATES, AND RECOVERIES
FROM FINANCIAL CRISES: THE UNITED STATES AND
ARGENTINA IN THE 1890S
3.1 Introduction
After the 2007-08 financial crisis there was a surge in interest in the factors that
cause crises. Now that some years have passed, however, more research is focusing on
how economies recover from crises. In the historical literature that focuses on growth
during the “first era of globalization,” changes in terms of trade and tariff rates have
been associated with economic growth.1 Here, I focus on the role that these variables
played in explaining recoveries from financial crises, and argue that commodity price
changes were more strongly connected to renewed economic growth than were changes
in tariff policies.
I focus on the United States and Argentina, and the 1890s in particular, when each
of these countries experienced major financial crises and prolonged economic downturns,
as well as shifts in terms of trade and tariff rates. Case studies offer details about the
economic and political context in which terms of trade and tariff movements occurred. I
also present newly compiled regional and sectoral data, which allow for a deeper analysis
of how changes in terms of trade and tariff rates impacted these economies. The case
studies presented in this chapter complement Chapter 2 of this dissertation, which is
1I focus on the years 1870-1913, often referred to as the “first era of globalization,” when the global
economy was relatively highly integrated (as measured by international flows of goods, capital, and
people).
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based on a panel of 30 peripheral countries spanning the years 1870-1913 and tests the
impacts that commodity price shifts or trade policy changes had on boosting economic
growth in the aftermath of financial crises. That approach studies the relationships
between terms of trade, tariff rates, and recoveries from financial crises across several
economically volatile decades. But the main findings (that tariff rate shocks had a
positive impact on output growth after crises in temperate countries while terms of
trade shocks had a negative impact in tropical countries) do not necessarily explain
every crisis in every country over that period. This chapter builds on that analysis by
taking the cases of the United States and Argentina in the 1890s, and looking more
closely at how changes in terms of trade and tariff rates were connected to renewed
economic growth after crises.
In that panel data econometric analysis of how terms of trade and tariff shocks impact
growth after crises, I focus on those two explanatory variables because they summarize
two competing narratives: (1) government policy played a role in helping economies
recover from crises, or (2) higher commodity prices helped economies grow again. To
take that analysis further, here I focus on those same factors, looking in more detail at
when and how those variables changed and how they fit into the boom-crisis-bust periods
facing the United States and Argentina over the 1890s. Recent studies of recoveries from
crises take a longer-run perspective. Reinhart and Rogoff (2014), for example, look at 100
financial crises from 1857 to 2013, and measure crisis characteristics such as the number
of years from peak to trough or peak to recovery (of GDP per capita).2 Brunnermeier and
Schabel (2016) also take a long-run approach, systematically accounting for institutional
responses to financial crises over the past 400 years. In contrast, I focus more narrowly
on two particularly severe crisis periods and seek to explain how recoveries occurred.
2See also Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009a.
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To better delineate the similarities and differences between the economic recoveries
that occurred in the United States and Argentina in the 1890s, I frame the experiences of
these countries in an international context. I then look at the experience of each country
individually, analyzing how changes in commodity prices and tariffs impacted various
measures of post-crisis economic growth over the 1890s. I analyze a wide range of data
on the economic conditions in these countries at this time, including newly compiled
monthly regional trade data for the United States. The evidence consistently suggests
that these economies benefited from upswings in commodity prices, which encouraged
economic growth several years after major crisis periods. The relationship between
changes in tariff rates and renewed economic growth is less clear.
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Data: definitions and sources
In Chapter 2 of this dissertation I test how changes in terms of trade and tariff rates
impacted recoveries from financial crises. Here I extend the analysis of terms of trade
and tariff rate changes during times of crisis by taking into account other economic and
political variables for which data are available. These additional factors offer insights
beyond average terms of trade and tariff rate figures, by showing trends in the factors
that underlie those aggregated measures. For example, in addition to looking at the
terms of trade data, I also look at the export and import data series that are used to
calculate the terms of trade.
Still, the main data used in this chapter are measures of terms of trade and tariff
rates, focusing on the timing of significant changes in these variables and how those
changes aligned with recoveries from financial crises. Terms of trade is the ratio of
export to import prices. Tariff rates are calculated by dividing the total government
revenue from imports by the value of imports to a given country in a given year. The
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terms of trade data are from Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson (2007), and the tariff
data are from Clemens and Williamson (2004).3.
While I focus on Argentina and the United States, the full data set (building on
Clemens and Williamson, 2004) covers 35 countries over 40+ years. It spans a range
of European countries (Austria-Hungary, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Norway, Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) as well
as countries in every other continent (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Burma, Canada,
Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, New
Zealand, Peru, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the United States, and Uruguay).
Other data series that are incorporated into this analysis include indicators of whether
a banking crisis, currency crisis, or sovereign default occurred in a given country in a
given year (Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b); Bordo and Meissner (2007); Esteves (2007b);
Suter (1990)).4 The high volatility of the “first era of globalization” makes it an es-
pecially interesting period to study. Significant financial crises occurred throughout
this period in particular countries, but there were also times when international crises
spread across countries (clustered around the late 1870s, the early 1890s, and 1907). In
Argentina, the 1890 Baring crisis was particularly severe, as was the 1893 panic and
subsequent depression in the United States.
3.2.2 Data: international trends
This section describes the trends that terms of trade and tariff rates followed over the
1870-1913 period across a range of countries. In the case studies below, these data
(terms of trade and tariffs) are discussed for the U.S. and Argentinian cases specifically.
3I am grateful to Jeffrey Williamson for sharing an updated version of this database with me (Septem-
ber 2016).
4See figure C.1 in the data appendix for a graph of these data.
74
The purpose here is to set up the broader global context for these variables, so that the
U.S. and Argentinian cases can be compared to international trends.
There are key differences and similarities in the changes of these variables in Ar-
gentina and the United States over the 1890s. The tariff and terms of trade data for
these two countries are presented in figure 3.1, along with the averages of these data
across all the countries in the sample. Panel a shows how tariff rates fluctuated more
widely in Argentina after the 1890 crisis there, compared to the sharper but more con-
sistent increasing trend in tariff rates several years after the 1893 crisis in the United
States. As discussed in detail in the case studies below, there is not a clear correlation
between tariff rate changes and recovery from the 1890 crisis in Argentina, though in-
creased tariff rates do align with aspects of the timing of recovery from the 1893 crisis
in the United States. For both of these countries, the improvements in terms of trade
in the 1890s (in the early-to-mid-1890s in Argentina, and the late-1890s in the United
States; panel b) coincided with the recoveries from the major final crises those countries
experienced.
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Figure 3.1: Tariff and terms of trade data – Argentina and the United States, 1870-1913
(a) Tariff
(b) Terms of trade
Note: “whole sample” includes a range of countries across the Americas, Europe, Asia, Australasia, and
North Africa.
Sources: Tariff data are from Clemens and Williamson (2004), terms of trade data are from Blattman,
Hwang, and Williamson (2007). 76
The experiences of Argentina and the United States contrast with the averages across
the whole sample. Figure 3.1 also shows the average annual estimates of tariff rates
(panel a) and terms of trade (panel b) for the whole sample. For tariff rates, the notable
trends are that average rates jumped in the mid-1880s (except for a downturn around
1885), remained relatively high through 1905 (with a sustained, but slight, increase in the
early 1890s), and then began to fall again. In Argentina, tariff rates did not experience
the same sustained increase seen in the sample average in the early 1890s. In contrast,
the sharp and sustained increase in tariff rates in the United States was more dramatic
than seen in the sample average.
For the whole sample, the average of the terms of trade index (figure 3.1, panel
b) climbed from the mid-1870s, remained relatively high through the late-1880s, and
then fell to a low point around 1901 before climbing again. Again, the sample averages
contrast with the experiences of Argentina and the United States over the 1890s, as
these countries saw significant improvements in their terms of trade, beginning in mid-
and late-1890s, respectively.
Long-run differences in terms of trade between more and less developed countries have
been observed in previous studies (Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950; Lewis, 1952; Hadass and
Williamson, 2003). One useful way to divide this sample of countries into sub-samples
that share particular characteristics is to look separately at what have been called regions
of recent settlement (or white settler colonies). These countries are similar in that they
had substantial immigration from European countries, similar development trajectories,
and produced/exported temperate commodities such as wheat and wool (Lewis, 1978b).
Argentina and the United States fit this description (along with Australia, Canada,
Chile, New Zealand, and Uruguay). Average tariff rates (figure C.2 in the appendix) in
these countries rose earlier than for the whole sample average, beginning around 1875
(and then falling during the years leading up to World War I). Average terms of trade
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followed a slight upward trajectory for these countries over the sample period, but had a
notable downturn in the early 1890s. The United States differs from the other regions of
recent settlement in that it did not experience as dramatic an improvement in terms of
trade in the mid-1890s, but the United States did share the experience of a big upturn in
terms of trade at the end of that decade. Additionally, the late-1890s tariff rate increase
in the United States was more extreme than experienced in the other regions of recent
settlement, including Argentina.
Tariff rates and terms of trade in Argentina and the United States generally followed
the same patterns seen in other regions of recent settlement. Despite U.S. tariff rates
being very high at the beginning of the sample period, tariff rates in the United States
and Argentina generally fell in the same 20 to 30 percent range, as also seen in averages
across Australia, Canada, Chile, New Zealand, and Uruguay. That range was consid-
erably higher than was seen in either European or tropical countries. Terms of trade
rose from the 80 to the 110 range in both Argentina and the United States from 1870
to 1913, and fell significantly in the mid-1890s, again aligning with trends in the other
regions of recent settlement but contrasting with the European and tropical subsamples.
Thus the upswing in terms of trade that benefited the U.S. and Argentinian economies
in the mid-to-late 1890s was also seen in similar temperate countries at that time, as
would be expected given their export of similar commodities.
The main argument developed in the case studies below is that positive swings in
commodity prices in the United States and Argentina helped those economies recovery
from the financial crises of the early 1890s. The main argument in Chapter 2 of this
dissertation is that changes in tariff rates played more of a role in recoveries from crises
in temperate economies than did changes in terms of trade. But the evidence developed
in the case studies here does not necessarily undermine that finding. Over the whole
subsample of temperate countries, the general trend could still be that tariff changes
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played a bigger role in recoveries from crises than did terms of trade shocks. But for the
1890s in Argentina and the United States, as the data presented above show, there was
an exceptionally big upswing in the terms of trade across the mid-to-late-1890s. There
were other significant medium-run increases in terms of trade in these countries, such
as those leading to the terms of trade peaks at 1880 and 1909 in Argentina, and 1884
and 1910 in the United States. While improving terms of trade could be economically
beneficial to these countries at any time, the importance of the sharp increases in terms
of trade in the United States and Argentina in the 1890s centers on the fact that these
increases occurred several years after these countries experienced extreme financial crises.
The case studies developed below indicate that these terms of trade swings helped drive
these recoveries (though that does not necessarily suggest that this relationship holds
for all countries and all periods).
3.3 Case study: United States
3.3.1 The Panic of 1893 and the mid-1890s depression in the United States
The United States experienced a major depression from 1893-1897. Businesses closed,
investment stalled, and unemployment was widespread (Closson, 1894). Sustained re-
covery began in 1897, but whether this was due to protectionist policies or market
conditions that were favorable for American agricultural exports is a longstanding de-
bate (Taussig, 1897; Bent, 2015a). While a turn to protectionism did coincide with
renewed economic growth after 1897, the evidence presented here suggests that rising
commodity prices played a stronger role in helping the U.S. economy recover from the
depression that followed the 1893 panic.
In the years leading up to the 1893 crisis, the United States expanded westward. Just
as expansion in Argentina led to the settling of the pampas and the subsequent growth
of agricultural activity there, settlers in the United States moved west and staked out
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new farms. From 1870-90, “the number of farms in the United States rose by nearly
four-fifths, to 4,545,000, and it increased by a fourth again by the end of the century”
(Steeples and Whitten, 1998, p. 15). Railroad construction also increased significantly,
preceding and helping to drive these population movements. Yet bad weather and agri-
cultural overproduction occurred in the years leading up to 1893, negatively impacting
prices. Thus the “Midwestern and Southern farming regions seethed with discontent”
while “debt payments and low prices restricted agrarian purchasing power” and the
“foreclosure of farm mortgages impaired the liquidity of mortgage companies, banks,
and other lenders” (ibid., p. 22). International crises, such as the French recession of
1889 and the Baring Crisis of 1890, put further pressure on the U.S. economy (Kindle-
berger and Aliber, 2005, p. 17 and p. 119).
Another disturbance facing the U.S. economy in the early 1890s was the strengthen-
ing of pro-inflation sentiments. Low prices encouraged “political radicals, debt-pressed
farmers, and angry workingmen” to push for the unlimited coinage of silver dollars
(Steeples and Whitten, 1998, p. 29). Six new states entered the U.S. in 1889-90, and
they were all significant sources of silver. People began to fear that the U.S. adherence
to the gold standard would be undermined, and inflationary fears pushed more domestic
and foreign investors to convert their dollars to gold (ibid., p. 30).
These political developments occurred at a time with the U.S. economy was feeling
the negative impact of the international economic turbulence that followed the Baring
crisis (Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005, p. 17 and p. 119). Widespread uncertainty and
the outflow of gold hurt demand and investment. Businesses began to fail in 1893 as
a result of these adverse conditions. A significant blow to the U.S. economy came in
February, 1893, when the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad failed. Through May, 1893,
U.S. industrial securities took major hits at the New York Stock Exchange, culminating
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in an outright stock market crash on May 5th.5 By the end of 1893, 199 railroad
companies had failed, and 15,242 firms went under overall (Steeples and Whitten, 1998,
p. 37; see also Richardson and Gou, 2011).
Following the Panic of 1893 came four years of economic recession and turmoil.
While real GDP increased from 1894-95, overall the years 1893-97 were characterized
by widespread hardship and uncertainty. Observations from a contemporary of this
depression offer a summary of the general difficulties facing the United States during
this time:
It may be said in a few words, for it needs not elaboration or statistical
tables, that the condition in this country on the election-day of 1896 was more
deplorable than at any other period following the American Revolution. . . .
[T]here was never such a condition of horror and doubt and uncertainty and
fear as there was on the day when Mr. McKinley was elected President of
the United States. . . . There was more idle labor than ever had been known
before. There were more idle spindles, mills, factories and shops than had
been known before. Foreign trade was falling off. Home markets had been
destroyed. Confidence was to be found nowhere. Hunger, nakedness, fear,
disaster, trouble were to be encountered everywhere (Grosvenor, 1900, p.
42).
This picture of the general difficulties facing the American public during this time is
supported by the economic data presented in figure 3.2.
5McSeveney (1972, p. 33) places the start of the depression on May 4, 1893, when the National
Cordage Company “collapsed for want of capital.” Rezneck (1953, p. 324) identifies May 5, 1893 as the
“Industrial Black Friday” that brought about the depression.
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Figure 3.2: U.S. economic indicators, 1890-1905.
(a) Unemployment (b) Wages
(c) Industrial production (d) Consumption
Sources: Unemployment: Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013). Wages: NBER Macrohistory database,
a08061a U.S. Index of Composite Wages 1820-1909, http://www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory. In-
dustrial production: Sutch and Carter (2006), Historical Statistics of the United States, series Cb 28-
31, Miron-Romer 13 component index (1909=100). Consumption: Barro-Ursua Macroeconomic Data
(2010), http://scholar.harvard.edu/barro/publications/barro-ursua-macroeconomic-data.
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Romer (1986) and Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) provide estimates of histor-
ical unemployment rates (figure 3.2, panel a) which support Grosvenor’s claims. The
unemployment rate approached 10 percent from 1894-97, in contrast to rates of less than
5 percent for the years prior to the Panic of 1893. Surveys of unemployment conditions
in various American cities during the mid-1890s supports these data by describing, both
qualitatively and quantitatively, how severe the unemployment crisis was in different
regions during the depression (Closson, 1894; Rezneck, 1953). Overall it is clear that
the mid-1890s saw elevated unemployment levels and widespread hardships, as also seen
in the depressed wages, industrial production, and consumption data (figure 3.2, panels
b-d).
GDP data for the mid-1890s show that the U.S. economy had a period of fitful ex-
pansion from 1894-95, but overall the mid-1890s is characterized as a period of economic
depression (figure 3.3). As discussed below in the Argentina case study, the Baring Crisis
was managed in Britain by the swift actions of the Bank of England. In contrast, the
depression following the 1893 panic in the U.S. was more like the Argentinian case in
that it stretched on for four years before the economy started back on a path of sustained
growth.
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Figure 3.3: U.S. GDP per capita, 1890-1905
Note: Quarterly GDP per capita estimates.
Source: Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013).
What ultimately caused the end of the 1890s depression in the U.S. has been an
ongoing debate. At the time, protectionist Republicans argued that the 1897 Dingley
Tariff Act promoted recovery from the 1890s depression, as a new regime of high tariff
rates helped American businesses feel assured of growth and continued protection, thus
encouraging them to invest and engage in production and propel the economy out of
the depression (Bent, 2015a, 2015b). Others have been skeptical of the claim that the
Dingley Tariff helped end that depression. White (1939, p. 14), for example, wrote that
these claims were only supported by those in “highly partisan circles.” This was exem-
plified by people like Republican Senator Justin Morrill of Vermont, who argued that
increased tariff rates would be “something which the people would be likely to approve
as looking toward a revival of the business interests of the country,” and Republican
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Representative Nelson Dingley, Jr., who declared that the tariff “shall reestablish that
policy of protection to American industries which for thirty years gave the United States
such prosperity and elevated the wages of the people of this country as was never known
in the world” (quoted in White, 1982, p. 54). In contrast, White argues that “A more
dispassionate opinion attached some significance to the rapidly developing and sizable
foreign markets for American manufactures” in explaining the recovery (ibid., p. 14).
Specifically, White argues that rising prices for American wheat exports in the late-1890s
helped the American economy recover from the depression. I build on White’s argument,
and present more and new data that show how rising commodity prices coincided with
renewed economic growth in the late 1890s, while higher tariff rates did not induce the
increased economic activity that the proponents of protectionism had hoped for.
3.3.2 Terms of trade and recovery: United States
Terms of trade estimates for the United States over this period are shown in figure 3.4
(panel a). The prolonged downturn in terms of trade in the 1890s coincides with the
major economic depression of that decade. The sharp improvement in terms of trade
seen in the late 1890s occurred as the economy recovered from that depression.
In early 1897, economists, business owners, and industrialists were expressing “gen-
eral indications of pessimism” about the state of the U.S. economy (White, 1939, p.
13). Yet by the end of 1897 the economy had begun to recover. White cites contempo-
rary sources who observed the recovery taking off most forcefully in the western United
States, where agriculture was the foundation of the economy. The main impetus for
renewed economic growth beginning in 1897, White argues, was U.S. wheat production:
“Beyond all other factors . . . much emphasis was placed upon the relationship of the
profitable marketing of the large American wheat crop of 1897 to the recovery then being
experienced” (ibid., p. 14). White presents data from contemporary newspapers, trade
journals, agricultural journals, American consuls abroad, and government sources to
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support his argument that high prices for wheat exports propelled the U.S. economy out
of the 1890s depression. Steeples and Whitten (1956, p. 72) also argue that the “record
for farm exports after the harvest of 1897 spoke eloquently of the role of foreign demand
for American crops in inducing business recovery.” They emphasize the role of wheat in
particular: “In fiscal 1898 and 1899 the movement overseas of American goods rose by
about $225 million, perhaps 2 percent of gross national product, over the year ending
June 30, 1897. Enlarged wheat shipments that totaled $130 more than the annual rate
for fiscal 1897 accounted for more than half the increase” (ibid.). More recently compiled
data on wheat export values during the late 19th and early 20th centuries support those
claims (Sutch and Carter, 2006, Historical Statistics of the United States). These data
are presented in figure 3.4 (panel b) along with the export figures for other commodities
and manufactures.
Figure 3.4: U.S. terms of trade and exports, 1890-1905.
(a) Terms of trade (b) Exports (value, millions of dollars)
Sources: Panel a: Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson (2007). Panel b: Sutch and Carter (2006),
Historical Statistics of the United States, Table Ee569-589.
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Figure 3.4 (panel b) shows that the value of American wheat exports was high in
1892, the year before the panic. The value of these exports then fell dramatically during
the depression years, from $161 million in 1892 down to $40 million in 1896. It then rose
again beginning in 1897, increasing to $146 million by 1898. This fits with the argument
that rising prices for U.S. wheat exports spurred the recovery that began in 1897, as this
windfall provided much-needed revenue for the economically and politically important
American agricultural sector.6
Agricultural production data highlight similar trends. Figure 3.5 (panel a) shows
wheat production falling during the mid-1890s depression years, then spiking sharply
and staying elevated as the economy recovered from 1897 onward. Wholesale prices
show similar trends (figure 3.5, panel b). The price of a bushel of wheat fell from $0.84
in 1890 down to $0.49 in 1894, before climbing again to $0.81 in 1897. Though the whole-
sale prices decreased again after 1897, the fact that they increased from the depression’s
trough up through the beginning of the recovery in 1897 supports the argument that fa-
vorable conditions in the wheat market helped the economy recover from the depression.7
Higher commodity prices meant higher agricultural incomes, which could then support
increased consumption and investment in capital goods, stimulating economic growth
more broadly.8 “Not until some branch of production (perhaps agriculture) gains new
purchasing power, does the growing demand, increasing concurrently with production,
spread in ever-widening circles to many occupations—until, finally, all available capi-
tal and labor find employment in new adjustments” (Laughlin, 1897, quoted in White,
6Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) have quarterly GDP estimates for the United States at this
time, and they estimate that the recession ended halfway through 1897.
7Figure 3.4 (panel b) also includes export data for other commodities, for the sake of comparison.
Trends in wool prices are discussed in more detail below.
8A similar “farm channel” has been put forth as an impetus for recovery during the Great Depression
(Hausman, Rhode, and Wieland, 2017). They argue that a devalued dollar raised agricultural prices,
spurring investment by farmers, measured through increased auto purchases.
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1939, p. 13, footnote 3). In the United States in 1900, 29,073,000 people were gain-
fully employed, and 11,288,000 of those people were working in agriculture, compared
to 4,253,000 in manufacturing (Miller and Brainerd, 1957, p. 399). Rising prices for
agricultural goods would thus have a stimulating effect for more people in the economy
than would higher wages in manufacturing jobs benefiting from protectionism.
Figure 3.5: U.S. wheat production, prices, and exports 1870-1913.
(a) Production (b) Wheat exports and prices (wholesale; US$)
Sources: Production: Sutch and Carter (2006). Historical Statistics of the United States, series Da717-
729. Prices: ibid., Table Cc205-266. Exports: ibid., Table Ee569-589
After the 1893 panic, this farm channel worked in reverse, as lower commodity prices
undermined the broader U.S. economy:
Luckily for the United States, the Chicago miracle [“a food surplus and fan-
tastic growth in manufactured food exports”] kept on ticking for a few years
between 1890 and 1893. A famine in southern Russia caused wheat prices
to shoot up, buoying international demand for American breadstuffs and
ensuring that gold and credit were still available. But in 1893, Argentina
exported a huge percentage of its total wheat production to obtain currency
to pay off the Barings loans. A fantastic harvest in Russia saw wheat pro-
duction shoot up 38 percent in the same year, causing a glut in the world
wheat supply. This glut of 1893 established what merchants throughout the
world agreed would now be a new and lower floor for the international price
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of wheat. At the end of the nineteenth century a new and lower floor in
international wheat prices could cripple the American economy. American
railroads, midwestern banks, western banks, and urban crossroads cities like
Chicago all depended on $1 wheat bushels. Just as American institutions
before 1837 had depended on cotton at twenty cents a pound, so the sudden
drop in wheat prices had a similar effect on mortgages. Banks in Omaha,
Kansas, and California that had issued farm mortgages to wheat growers
began defaulting (Nelson, 2012, pp. 188-89).
The course of the 1890s depression was then driven by these commodity price move-
ments.9 Toward the end of that decade, higher wheat prices were associated with recov-
ery from the depression:
In certain highly partisan circles attempts were made to attribute this re-
covery to the Dingley Tariff Act of July 1897, for a fundamental tenet of
the Republican campaign propaganda of 1896 had been the restoration of a
high protective tariff as the main essential for renewed prosperity. A more
dispassionate opinion attached some significance to the rapidly developing
and sizeable [sic] foreign markets for American manufactures. Beyond all
other factors, however, much emphasis was placed upon the relationship of
the profitable marketing of the large American wheat crop of 1897 to the
recovery then being experienced (White, 1939, p. 14).
The wheat price, production, and export data (figure 3.5) show how contemporary
observers and later researchers could support arguments in favor of wheat playing a
leading role in the recovery.10 Each of these measures surged around 1897, the year the
recovery began in earnest (following the 1896 double dip). Rising wheat prices in 1897
were held up as a sign of the renewed strength of the U.S. economy. In a journal entry
from August 21, 1897, Charles Dawes noted that wheat prices were at heights not seen
since 1891, and he took this to signal that “Prosperity seems to be dawning at last.”11
9For more on how similar trends in wheat prices played out in 1890s Britain see Farnsworth (1934).
10Jacks (2013) also documents rising real commodity prices over this same period, after generally
depressed prices during the mid-1890s.
11Charles G. Dawes, later Comptroller of the Currency and Vice President of the United States, as
quoted in Rezneck (1953, p. 326).
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Rising wheat prices, production, and exports buoyed optimism that the depression was
finally over, encouraging higher consumption and investment (figure 3.2).
Even short-term increases in wheat prices in 1897 helped farmers’ finances in ways
that could have longer-term positive impacts on the economy more broadly. In 1897
farm income increased between $400 million and $1 billion (which includes the effect
of appreciating farm land values and farm product prices) (White, 1982, p. 80). This
allowed farmers to pay down their mortgages and to invest in industrial goods. Wheat
producing regions in the upper Mississippi Valley were identified by trade journals as
booming markets for manufactured products, as farmers’ incomes increased (ibid., pp.
80-81). Altogether this evidence suggests that the wheat producing regions of the West
propelled the recovery starting in 1897.
3.3.3 Tariffs and recovery: United States
Average tariff rates in the United States were high leading up to the 1890s, fell during
the 1890s, then rose sharply again after 1897 before falling in the years before World War
I. The general trends are seen in figure 3.6. The “tariff” measure in figure 3.6 is from
from Clemens and Williamson (2004b), and the AVE measure shows a more detailed
annual series of average tariff rates, along with Irwin’s (2010) trade restrictiveness index
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(TRI).12 Each of these series shows how a period of relatively low tariff rates coincided
with the mid-1890s depression in the United States, and highlights how high tariff rates
were in the years following the 1897 Dingley Tariff Act.
12In addition to ad valorem equivalent (AVE) tariff measures of Clemens and Williamson, another
measure of U.S. trade policies during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is Irwin’s (2010)
trade restrictiveness index (TRI). This indicator is calculated from the share of imports of a good in
GDP, the elasticity of import demand for that good, and the import tariff imposed on that good (Irwin,
2010, p. 113; building on Anderson and Neary, 2005, and Kee, Nicita, and Olarreaga, 2008). Lampe
and Sharp (2013, p. 215) note that Irwin’s TRI is “theoretically better grounded and more reliable”
than AVE measures. Likewise, Irwin (2010, p. 111) argues that there are four shortcomings to using
AVE measures: (1) they are downward biased since goods subjected to prohibitively high tariffs are not
accounted for; (2) the dispersion of import duties across goods is ignored; (3) economic interpretation is
difficult (Irwin gives the example that an AVE of 50 percent might restrict trade as much as an AVE of
25 percent); and (4) nontariff barriers such as quotas are not accounted for in AVE estimates. Irwin’s
TRI and AVE measures are highly correlated (0.92 correlation coefficient), but the TRI levels are higher.
Irwin has calculated a TRI for the U.S. from 1867 to 1961. These estimates are shown in figure 3.6.
While both series follow a similar pattern, the TRI figures highlight how strongly protectionist the 1897
tariff legislation was. It would be useful to have TRI measures for all the countries in the sample to
test whether the main results hold. But the only other historical TRI estimates of which I am aware
are for Italy (Federico and Vasta, 2015).
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Figure 3.6: U.S. average tariff rates, 1880-1910.
Note: “AVE” are my calculations of the ad valorem equivalent approximation of
average tariff rates (AVE = customs duty revenue / total imports for domestic
consumption).
Sources: “Tariff” data are from Clemens and Williamson (2004b). Customs revenue
data and imports data (used to calculate “AVE”) are from Sutch and Carter (2006),
Historical Statistics of the United States. The “TRI” (trade restiveness index) data
are from Irwin (2010).
Tariff policy was a focal point of debates over how to get the U.S. economy out of the
depression. After several decades of Republicans’ protectionist trade policies, from 1893-
1897 the Democrats held the executive office and President Grover Cleveland reduced
tariff rates. When the Republicans returned to the White House in 1897, President
William McKinley quickly imposed the strongly protectionist Dingley Tariff Act, raising
tariffs rates to historical highs.
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The political economy of these developments has been studied in depth.13 In the
decades leading up to the 1890s, Republicans had overseen a robust protectionist envi-
ronment, though that changed after the panic of 1893 and the election of the Democratic
president Grover Cleveland, an advocate for more liberal trade policies. But Republicans
continued to push for protectionism, and when they returned to power under William
McKinley’s presidency in 1897, protectionist policies reached new heights through the
Dingley Tariff legislation. Senator Nelson Dingley, Republican from Maine and Chair-
man of the Ways and Means Committee, expected wool manufactures to be the most
important source of duty revenues for the federal government after the protectionist
legislation of 1897 was signed into law. His estimates of how much revenue the federal
government could earn from tariffs on major categories of imported goods are presented
in figure 3.7. Dingley promoted this legislation in order to “encourage the industries of
the United States,” raise revenue for the federal government (figure 3.7), and protect
American workers which would in turn increase demand for American products.14
13See, for example: Taussig, 1905; Taussig, 1934; Hoffman, 1970; White, 1982; Steeples and Whitten,
1998; Bent, 2015a and 2015b.
14Dingley argued that “revenue should be at least equal to expenditures, with the conviction that
in adjusting duties to secure such equality it is a wise policy to encourage home production and man-
ufactures, and thus provide employment at good wages for the laborers of our people, upon whose
purchasing power depends the market for our products” (“Mr. Dingley’s Estimates,” New York Times,
March 16, 1897).
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Figure 3.7: Estimated tariff revenue, by goods category (1897 US$).
Source: “Mr Dingley’s Estimates,” New York Times, March 16, 1897.
Advocating for these policies in 1897, Dingley and his fellow Republicans were in
a position of power as McKinley returned the Republican party to the White House.
Republicans took advantage of the fact that Cleveland’s tenure and policies overlapped
with the mid-1890s depression, and they used that opportunity to argue that protection-
ism would promote recovery. “As the years succeeding [the Panic of] 1893 grew blacker
and blacker, the staunch protectionists had the opportunity to cry: ‘We told you so; let
us return to the policy of prosperity’ ” (Taussig, 1964, p. 323).
Just because the Republicans argued that protectionism would promote prosper-
ity does not mean that such a connection necessarily existed. Stern (1971) argues that
the Republican party at this time was “primarily a business-enterprise-promotion agency
dedicated to the determination of tariff schedules by the protectionist beneficiaries them-
selves” (p. viii). That is, Republicans promoted tariff increases to benefit their allies’
narrow business interests, without having broader macroeconomic objectives. But recent
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empirical studies have confirmed the Republicans’ arguments. Lehmann and O’Rourke
(2011), for example, find a positive correlation between industrial tariffs and growth
at this time, suggesting that the Republican tariff policy could have helped the U.S.
economy grow after the 1890s depression. And Lampe and Sharp (2013) find that while
most of the turn-of-the-century countries in their study exhibit a negative correlation
between tariffs and growth, the case of the United States stands out for having a positive
relationship between these variables. Contrasting the results for the U.S. case against
the findings for other countries, they argue that “it seems plausible to assume that ac-
tually the United States was singular in the way this [tariff] policy was implemented
and focused on protection of manufactures” (Lampe and Sharp, 2013, p. 219). This fits
with the qualitative evidence which highlights the Republicans’ support for particular
industries such as manufacturers of woolen goods (figure 3.7). But the evidence is not
conclusive. Irwin (2001) argues against making too much of the positive correlations
that empirical analyses find between protectionist policies and economic growth. “That
the high tariffs [of the turn-of-the-century United States] were accompanied by rapid
growth and industrialisation was noted by contemporary proponents of protectionism
and has been a source of controversy ever since” (ibid., p. 15).
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Figure 3.8: Number of sheep and wool prices, 1890-1905
(a) Sheep (b) Wool price
Note: The number of sheep is measured in hundreds of thousands. The wool price is the wholesale
price per pound. The vertical line is at 1897, the year the Dingley tariff was enacted. States in panel
a are as follows. The North Central states are Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, West
Virginia, and Kentucky. The South is comprised of Virgina North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and Tennessee. The Central West states are
Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and “Indian
Territory.” Wright (1910, p. 298) does not define the Middle Atlantic or New England states, but
presumably these include the states remaining outside of those listed above, in the appropriate regions.
Sources: Sheep: Wright (1910, p. 298), from data in the wool manufacturers’ Bulletin. Wool prices:
Sutch and Carter (2006), Historical Statistics of the United States, Table Cc205-266.
Wool was one of the biggest beneficiaries of protection under the Dingley tariff (fig-
ure 3.7). Like wheat, wool prices surged in 1897, and stayed at elevated levels through
the beginning of the 20th century (figure 3.8, panel b). Interestingly, sheep production
did not increase (figure 3.8, panel a) the way that wheat production did (figure 3.5,
panel a). There was a gradual increase in the number of sheep being raised in the North
Central states after 1897, but it is still surprising that more sheep were not raised in
response to the higher prices under the Dingley tariff. This suggests that the Dingley
tariff did not have a particularly strong impact on the agricultural sector.
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3.3.4 Regional trade data: United States
A regional analysis of the 1890s recovery in the United States addresses the fact
that commodity price movements and tariff rate changes could affect different regions
in different ways. Particular commodities experienced price increases at different times
through the late 1890s, and tariff legislation strongly favored some products over others.
As manufacturing and commodity production varied by region, looking closely at which
regions recovered sooner and faster allows for connections to be drawn between price
movements or increased tariffs rates and regional recovery patterns. This offers a more
complete understanding of the recovery at a level of detail not available through national-
level statistics.
It would be ideal if annual data were available for the 1890s covering all the census
categories. Annual data on agricultural, manufacturing, demographic, and related trends
in the economic development of the United States during this era would paint a much
more complete picture of the impacts of the 1890s depression, where and when the
recovery began, and what shape it took. Unfortunately, those data are generally only
available by decade.15. Decadal data are useful for analyzing longer-run changes in the
U.S. economy.16 But to study the economic fluctuations during the 1890s depression
requires data at a higher frequency than just 1890 and 1900.
Annual data tell a much more detailed story than decadal data, but monthly data
are ideal because they can account for the timing of specific events with more precision,
such as the enacting of the Dingley tariff legislation in July 1897. Toward this end,
I have compiled monthly import and export data for specific U.S. regions, from the
Summary Statement of the Imports and Exports of the United States (pre-1896) and the
15The historical census data are available, for example, from “Historical, Demo-
graphic, Economic, and Social Data: The United States, 1790-2002” (ICPSR 2896;
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/2896.
16See, for example, Kim (1998), Heim (2000), and Ramcharan (2010).
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Monthly Summary of Foreign Commerce of the United States (post-1896).17 These data
contribute in two ways to our understanding of the course of the 1890s depression and
recovery, by moving beyond national-level annual data and instead presenting a picture
of changes in the U.S. economy at (1) monthly frequency and (2) regional levels.
An additional benefit of these data is that they are consistent and nearly compre-
hensive. That is, they cover the whole country and account for every month of the
depression and recovery (with a few gaps). Previous regional studies of this depression
offer important insights into how the depression impacted some regions differently from
others, but not in a systematic way that allows for direct comparisons across different
parts of the country. Closson (1894), for example, studies how unemployment trends
varied across the country, based on surveys sent out to officials in a range of cities
and towns. This offers interesting contemporary snapshots of unemployment during the
depths of the depression, but only covers one year, and doesn’t necessarily cover each
region equally (because the study depended on the reliability of survey responses and
the level of detail provided by each respondent).
Other research focuses more narrowly on particular regions during the depression
(such as Line, 1912). This is also useful for understanding how the depression impacted
particular parts of the country, but faces the same limitation of not providing data that
can be compared across regions. By presenting such data, this chapter addresses claims
made in previous research about regional differences during the recovery, such as White’s
(1939, pp. 13-14) argument that “The contemporaneous reports were almost unanimous
in the opinion that this recovery had first appeared in the West, but it was also reported,
to a lesser extent in the East.” Regional trade data allow for such claims to be tested.
17There are some gaps in these data, such for as exports from the interior of the United States. The
regions are defined in table C.1 in the data appendix.
98
Regional variations in the trajectory of the depression and recovery are important
because the two main focuses of this literature—the impact that commodity price move-
ments and tariff changes had on the economy over the course of the depression—played
out differently across the country depending on the characteristics of regional economies.
Farnsworth (1934), White (1939), Rezneck (1953), and Nelson (2012), for example, all
argue that rising wheat prices played a significant, if not the most important, role in
helping the economy recovery from the depression. Others have argued that the high
tariff rates of Dingley act helped encourage investment and growth as expectations were
stabilized, domestic industry was protected from foreign competition, and customs rev-
enue helped secure government finances.18 But growth trajectories could vary at the
regional level within countries, and tariffs could impact different regions in disparate
ways depending on the economic activity defining each region. The same is true for
commodity price swings. By analyzing new series of regional economic data at monthly
frequency, this study moves beyond research which drew conclusions at the national
level about which factors had the most impact on the course of the 1890s depression and
recovery.
18See Wolcott (1900), White (1982), Bent (2015a, 2015b).
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Figure 3.9: Imports (monthly data; million US$), 1893-1900
(a) Atlantic (b) Gulf
(c) Pacific (d) Northern
(e) Interior
Note: The vertical line in each graph indicates the month and year (July 1897) when the Dingley tariff
legislation was signed into law.
Sources: Summary Statement of the Imports and Exports of the United States [pre-1896 data] and
Monthly Summary of Foreign Commerce of the United States [post-1896].
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Figure 3.10: Exports (monthly data; million US$), 1893-1900
(a) Atlantic (b) Gulf
(c) Pacific (d) Northern
Note: The vertical line in each graph indicates the month and year (July 1897) when the Dingley tariff
legislation was signed into law. Export data are not available for the “interior” region of the United
States for these years.
Sources: Summary Statement of the Imports and Exports of the United States [pre-1896 data] and
Monthly Summary of Foreign Commerce of the United States [post-1896].
The first trend that stands out from the data on imports (figure 3.9) is that people
reacted to the tariff increases of July 1897 by massively increasing the amount of goods
they imported in the months before the higher tariff rates took effect (in each region
except for the Interior). This was after McKinley was elected (winter/spring 1896-87)
and right before the Dingley tariff law was enacted (summer 1897). In the Atlantic and
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Gulf ports, imports were then generally reduced for about 18 months, before picking
back up in 1898.19 The Pacific and Northern ports saw imports rebound sooner, while
imports in Interior ports fluctuated more variably. The Atlantic ports accounted for the
vast majority of the imports to the United States at this time. While there was a spike
in imports in Atlantic ports in the first half of 1898, a sustained increase in imports
did not begin until the final few months of that year. Using imports as an indicator
of general economic conditions, this suggests that the U.S. economy did not begin to
fully recover from the mid-1890s depression until the end of 1898, well after the Dingley
tariff was enacted. By this measure, if there was a positive impact of protectionism on
economic activity this effect was only seen over a year after tariff rates were increased.20
The export data (figure 3.10) cast further doubt on the argument that higher tariff
rates caused the recovery from the mid-1890s depression. While these data show clear
seasonal fluctuations, there are discernible long-run trends. In the Atlantic, Pacific,
and Northern ports, exports fell in 1893, the year of the panic. Then, in all four regions
(Atlantic, Pacific, Northern, as well as Gulf ports), exports began a general increase from
1894-95 (looking at general trends, rather than seasonal fluctuations). This indicates
19These import data do not appear to be as influenced by seasonality as the export data (figure 3.10).
20Expectations that tariff rates would increase under a Republican administration in 1897 caused
some manufacturers to invest in capital projects as early as 1894 (Weld, 1912, p. 92). This indicates
that any stimulus the Dingley tariff provided the U.S. economy could have occurred before 1897, as
well as after. Still, there was not a sustained increase in imports until later in that decade.
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that exports began picking up well before the 1897 return to protectionism, thus further
undermining claims that the Dingley tariff was instrumental to the post-1897 recovery.21
3.4 Case study: Argentina
3.4.1 The Baring Crisis and ensuing depression in Argentina
The 1890 Baring Crisis—“the nineteenth century’s most famous sovereign debt cri-
sis”—had significant impacts in Argentina during the last decade of nineteenth century
(Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2008, p. 462). The British side of the crisis was resolved
relatively quickly by the Bank of England, but in Argentina the crisis was part of a
broader recession.22 To analyze the factors that led to the resolution of this crisis, it is
helpful to present these developments within a broader framework. This includes the
structure of Argentina’s politics and economy in the decades leading up to 1890, as well
as the degree of British banks’ involvement in Argentina. Within this context, we see
the role that low commodity prices, especially for wheat, had in keeping the economy
mired in a recession, and then the role that price movements had in helping the economy
grow again. Average tariff rates did change in Argentina during this post-crisis period,
21If the protectionist Dingley tariff act had a widespread positive impact on U.S. manufacturing,
those firms could have increased their production of export goods as well as goods for the domestic
market. Since one of the main beneficiaries of the Dingley tariff was the woolen manufactures industry,
if protectionism encouraged the production of these goods for export that would be seen in the regional
export data, specifically in the Atlantic ports, as much of this manufacturing was based in the Northeast.
Table C.2 shows the percentage of the workforce, by state, that was engaged in agriculture versus other
sectors. These Census data actually discount the importance of agriculture in the U.S. economy at
this time (1900), because they do not account for independent farmers, only farm laborers. These data
confirm that the Northeastern and northern Midwestern states tended to have a much higher percentage
of workers engaged in nonagricultural sectors such as manufacturing. The export data for these more
industrialized regions do not indicate that the Dingley tariff had a significant impact on U.S. exports
of manufactured goods.
22In Argentina the crisis “had its origin in an ill-conceived domestic monetary and fiscal experiment:
the Law of National Guaranteed Banks . . . [which was] a leveraged arbitrage operation by which foreign
investors were implicitly partners in the business of issuing government guaranteed paper-money” (della
Paolera and Taylor, 2001a, pp. 24-25).
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but they fluctuated in an inconsistent way which suggests that protectionism did not
play a role in the recovery from the Baring Crisis in that country.
From 1880-1916 Argentina was ruled by the Partido Autonomista Nacionalista, a
strong federal government. This governing party came to power after spreading the
reaches of state power over Argentina’s fertile pampas region, thereby assuring that this
important agricultural area would be beholden to the interests of the Buenos Aires elite.
With its largely agricultural economy, Argentina exported pastoral products such as wool
and hides, as well as cereals. But in order for its agricultural export-based economy to
grow, Argentina required modern infrastructure, namely railroads.23 Financing for these
infrastructure projects came mainly from foreign sources (Ford, 1956, p. 133).
Argentina required an inflow of funds from abroad in order to finance its economic
expansion in the late nineteenth century. While it didn’t have a Central Bank, and even
lacked a national currency, Argentina was beholden to the structure of the gold standard.
In this setting British finances flowed in increasing quantities to Argentina, financing
government expenditures and development projects (Stone, 1999; Grossman, 2007, p.
50; Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2008, p. 464). The “investment boom became self-
expanding and self-generating, [with] many Europeans being dazzled with the prospects
of the second ‘America’ ” (Ford, 1956, p. 134). The 1880s in Argentina “stand out
as a period of totally unprecedented capital inflows into an emerging market at any
time in history” (Taylor, 2003, p. 177). But the boom turned into a bust, with a panic
precipitated by the failed loan from Barings Bank to Buenos Aires Water Supply in 1890
(della Paolera and Taylor, 2001b, p. 71).24 Thereafter, British enthusiasm for investing
23By 1900, the rail networks of Argentina and the United States were nearly equally developed, with
Argentina having 3.6 kilometers of railways per 1,500 inhabitants, and the United States having 4.1
kilometers per 1,500 inhabitants (the comparable figures for Uruguay, Mexico, and Venezuela in that
year were 2.0, 1.0, and 0.3, respectively) (Arroyo Abad, 2013, p. 42, Table 1).
24For more on Barings Bank—the “famous and much respected [financial] house”— see Andreades
(1909, p. 365).
104
in Argentina waned as investors realized “that there were considerable limitations to
the promise of the new El Dorado” (Ford, 1956, p. 135). By 1890 new capital issues in
London for investment in Argentina dropped toward zero (Stone, 1999). These capital
flow trends are shown in figure 3.11.
Figure 3.11: Gross British capital flows (£m) to Argentina and the United States, 1880-1913.
Source: Stone (1999).
Argentina, like the United States, saw a capital inflow boom in the late 1880s, before
investment fell sharply through the mid-1890s. Flores (2011, p. 194) argues that British
finance flowed to Argentina despite a “deteriorating macroeconomic and financial situ-
ation” leading up to the Baring Crisis. Capital flows to Argentina then all but stopped
after the crisis, before resuming in the mid-1890s as export prices rose and the economy
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began to recover, but capital inflows remained well below their late-1880s peak until
after 1905. Taylor (2003, p. 177) argues that it took that long for inflows to resume
because Argentina had to establish credibility among investors after going back on the
gold standard in 1899.25 Over the 1890s, British capital flows to the United States fol-
lowed a similar trajectory as in Argentina, as the crises of the early 1890s reduced capital
outflows from the main capital exporting economies (Britain, France, and Germany) to
peripheral economies.
In his study of the Baring Crisis, Ford highlights the role of the particular finan-
cial arrangements in Argentina at that time. Argentina made use of foreign investment
in order to develop, as did the United States. Railroads were often the primary focus
of this investment, and were necessary to get exportable agricultural products to mar-
kets. Yet there were underlying problems in this international capital exchange. As
the Argentinian economy cooled in the late 1880s, overseas borrowing decreased, and
the gold premium on Argentinian loans increased as debt-service charges were in gold
or sterling but “the government and the economy as a whole were being bolstered up
by currency issues” (Ford, 1956, p. 145). By 1890 Barings Bank was essentially in-
solvent, and the Argentinian securities it held could only be traded at a loss (ibid., p.
147). Though Andreades (1909, p. 366) argues that Barings was actually solvent in
1890, “it was impossible for the Barings to meet their liabilities.” Whether technically
solvent or not, it quickly became clear that Barings’ Argentina commitments were in
serious trouble. The Bank of England hurriedly met with representatives from Barings
in London and established a fund of £10 million to guarantee Barings’ obligations. The
day after that meeting, in mid-November 1890, the Bank of England announced that
it would guarantee Barings’ loans, which immediately “calmed the public and arrested
25Nakamura and Zarazaga (1997) argue that Argentina was well integrated into international capital
markets over the 1900-30 period.
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the panic” (ibid., p. 367). While these actions prevented an all-out financial panic in
Britain, broader economic problems in Argentina persisted, as prices for agricultural
exports stayed depressed through the mid-1890s.
3.4.2 Terms of trade and recovery: Argentina
Terms of trade and GDP data for Argentina are presented in figure 3.12. Panel a
shows terms of trade falling sharply during the early- and mid-1890s before rising again
just as sharply through 1899, suggesting that decreased prices for agricultural exports
after the Baring Crisis kept the Argentinian economy stuck in a recession, before rising
export prices helped that economy grow again in the mid-1890s.26 The trajectory of the
consumption index for Argentina also broadly follows these trends (figure 3.13).
Figure 3.12: Argentina terms of trade and GDP, 1885-1905.
(a) Terms of trade (b) GDP
Sources: Panel a: Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson (2007). Panel b: della Paolera, Taylor, and
Bózzoli (2003) [based on Wiliamson (1999)].
26Panel b shows the real and nominal GDP data, which both show the depression after the 1890
crisis.
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Figure 3.13: Argentina: consumption, 1885-1905
Source: Barro-Ursua Macroeconomic Database (2010).
An important part of the connection between low export prices and Argentina’s
prolonged recession was the significant lag between loans for investment projects and
the time when the gains from the investments were realized. For example, a loan might
be taken out to construct a railroad to bring agricultural products from the hinterland
to the coast for export, but it could take at least several years for the railroad to be built
and for the newly accessible farmland to start yielding profitable amounts of crops. Thus
when something like the Baring Crisis occurred, funds that were tied up in long-term
projects were not available to deal with problems such as Barings’ failed loans to the
Buenos Aires Water Supply company. Exports are relied upon to provide revenue which
can fund investment projects as well as pay for imports. But in a developing economy
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the time frame of big investment projects can result in a mismatch between when funds
are needed (to service loans and pay for imports) and when they are actually available.27
For Argentina, Ford identifies this process as occurring in the following sequence:
First, foreign borrowing peaked in 1888. Imports then reached their zenith in 1889.
Railroad construction did not peak until 1891. Grain production and exports only rose
in volume beginning in 1893. But the Baring Crisis occurred in 1890, and foreign lending
to Argentina took a major hit.28 The problem was that “Foreign debt-service charges,
which were payable once the debts had been incurred, had a large element fixed in terms
of gold and bore on the economy immediately. They remained in 1889 and onward,
whilst borrowing vanished almost immediately” (Ford, 1956, p. 139). Focusing more
closely on exports, Ford finds that they “showed no increase in value over 1889 figures
until 1898, owing to the slow maturing of investment projects, to climatic conditions,
and to the slump in world prices of Argentine exports between 1890 and 1896” (ibid., p.
139). Only when these conditions changed and export prices increased did the economy
recover from the depression.
Ford analyzes export price data for maize, wheat, wool, fleeces, and hides from 1887-
94 (table 3.1). The second column lists the nominal values for these combined exports
during this period. The third column adjusts these prices based on an average of the
prices for these goods from 1885-89.29
27I have not seen data to suggest that this issue was as prominent in the United States as it was in
Argentina. The United States had significant domestic investment in railroads, so if this issue did exist
it would not be as systemically destabilizing as it was in Argentina.
28This is supported by Stone’s (1999) data. See figure 3.11.
29Ford does this after first indexing the prices based on 1889, but then argues in favor of the averaging
approach (the one used to find the values in the third column of Table 3.1). Justifying his methodology,
Ford rhetorically asks: “is it appropriate to use 1889 prices for revaluing? For wool prices reached a
peak in that year, and by value wool and fleeces formed roughly half of exports. Surely it would be
better to use some average of prices—say 1885 to 1889—to measure the effect of changing export prices
over the whole period of boom and crisis” (Ford, 1956, p. 143).
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Table 3.1: Argentina: Exports of maize, wheat, wool, fleeces, and hides – 1887-94 (mil. USD)
Year At Current Values At 1885-89 Prices Price Effect
1887 65.5 69.0 -3.5
1888 74.5 70.5 +4.0
1889 91.5 75.5 +16.0
1890 77.0 86.5 -9.5
1891 67.5 79.0 -11.5
1892 87.0 97.0 -10.0
1893 63.5 100.5 -37.0
1894 72.5 136.5 -64.0
Source: Ford (1956): Table IV, p. 144.
To highlight the adverse price conditions facing Argentinian exports from 1887-94,
Ford subtracts the values found using the average of 1885-89 prices from the nominal
values. The results are shown in the fourth column of Table 3.1. The “price effect”
is negative in 1887, then positive in 1888 and 1889, before becoming negative again in
1890. From 1890-94 the trend of the price effect is to become increasingly negative. It is
-9.5 in 1890 and -64.0 in 1894. These findings fit Ford’s narrative—decreasing prices for
exports exacerbated Argentina’s crisis, since low prices for exports meant less income
for Argentina, thus making it difficult to service debts, finance development-promoting
infrastructure projects, and generally recover from the 1890s depression.
More recently compiled data on Argentinian prices are available from Francis (2014).
To extend Ford’s analysis, I present the prices series for the same set of export goods
(maize, wheat, wool, sheep skins, and salted hides) in figure 3.14.30 Ford’s focus was on
the depth of the depression, and the data from Francis confirm that prices fell through
the mid-1890s. Francis’ data also allow us to see when prices rose, with the general
pattern being that commodity prices did not see generally higher levels until the last
few years of that decade (despite some earlier spikes, such as the price of hides in
30From 1895-1899, maize made up 10% of Argentinian exports, wheat 13%, wool 37%, and hides 8%
(Tena Junguito and Willebald, 2013, p. 46).
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1895). These price trends align with the new Argentinian price index developed by Tena
Junguito and Willebald (2013, p. 41) for this period, as well as with the terms of trade
estimates from Williamson. Agricultural production also expanded massively around
this time, as the total cultivated land in Argentina grew from 40,000 to 143,000 square
kilometers between 1895 and 1914, during what has been described as an “agricultural
revolution on the pampas” (Fajgelbaum and Redding, 2014, p. 9). These swings in
commodity prices and agricultural production are correlated with the general movement
of the Argentinian economy over the last decade of the nineteenth century, from the
depression of the early-to-mid-1890s to the recovery over the latter half of that decade.
Figure 3.14: Argentina: prices, 1885-1905
Source: Francis (2014).
3.4.3 Tariffs and recovery: Argentina
Average tariff rates in Argentina over the 1890s followed a similar course as in the
United States, fluctuating from a high above 30 percent to a low of close to 20 percent.
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Average tariff rates in Argentina are shown in figure 3.15, along with GDP per capita
estimates (though these are artificially smooth because of interpolated population esti-
mates from 1870-1900). Tariff rates were lowest immediately after the 1890 crisis, and
had sharp increases a of couple years later and again at the end of the decade.
Figure 3.15: Argentina tariff rate
Source: Clemens and Williamson (2004b).
More detailed tariff information for select years over this period is available from
Rayes (2018) and is presented in table 3.2. These rates are from 1895, which Rayes
(2018, p. 3) argues is an illustrative example of the type of tariff legislation that was
enacted in Argentina in the 1890s. The 1895 customs legislation had tariff rates that
ranged from zero to 50 percent (ibid., p. 18 and p. 31). Zero or low tariff rates
were reserved for imports that were inputs in Argentinian industries, such as metals,
cotton, and railway components. Higher tariffs were placed on goods that competed with
domestic production (such as clothing and tanned leather) or were deemed potentially
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socially problematic (guns and ammunition). While lower tariff rates on selected imports
were helpful to Argentina’s domestic industry, Argentinian politicians at the turn of the
twentieth century did not direct tariff policy toward promoting industrialization, but
rather used it as a way to generate government revenue (Rayes, 2018, p. 24; Coatsworth
and Williamson, 2004, p. 224; Chiaramonte, 2012, pp. 190-194, cited by Rayes, 2018, p.
13; Barbero and Rocchi, 2003, p. 267). Along these lines, Barbero and Rocchi (2003, p.
268) note that “selective tariff protection was very far from being part of a grand plan
for industrial promotion” in turn-of-the-century Argentina.
Table 3.2: Argentina: tariff rates in 1895
Tariff Good
0% Cork Animals Ships
Reaper/thresher/gleaner Metal coins Charcoal/coal
Bottles for packaging Coke Wheat
Fresh fruit Locomotives Materials for school
Fresh fish Water filters Silver
Sugarcane Firewood Corn/wheat flour
2.5% Cotton Impure sulfur Hops
Zinc for packaging Bark Gemstones
5% Jewels Wire for reapers Wire for fences
Ploughs Quicksilver Gum
Threads for mowers/reapers Agricultural machinery parts Spun wool
Sewing machines Burlap Seeds
Saffron Sewing machine needles Bricks
10% White lead Thread for candles Antimony
Lead Tar Lime sulfate
Iron for bridges Cocoa Materials for railroads
Malt Small boats Machine parts
Fats Tins Materials for tramways
Carded jute Pitch
15% Pines Silk fabrics for sieves
20% Cottons fabrics
40% Textile bags Iron boxes Silk fabrics
Tanned leather/skins Wool blankets Fine laces
Match boxes
45% Socks
50% Weapons Ammunition Gunpowder
Cartridges for weapons Canes with swords Clothing
Suitcases/trunks Furniture Hats
Harnesses Carriages
Source: Rayes (2018, p. 31).
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Though Argentina was a predominantly agricultural economy at the turn of the
twentieth century, this was one of the fastest periods of industrial growth in Argentinian
history. Barbero and Rocchi (2003, p. 264) argue that this was driven by the integration
of Argentina’s economy into the world market rather than protectionism. The develop-
ment of industrial output in Argentina over this period is shown in figure 3.16. Industrial
output rose consistently across this period (averaging 8.04 percent annual growth from
1875-1900, and 7.82 percent annual growth from 1901-12; ibid., p. 267). While the
industries driving this growth, such as textile production, did benefit from protectionist
policies, they relied heavily on imported inputs (ibid., pp. 268-69). And it is important
to place this industrial growth in the context of the agriculturally oriented Argentinian
economy. In the years before World War I, 99.7% of Argentinian exports were primary
products, so even if tariff policies benefited Argentinian manufacturing industries that
would not have had a big enough impact on overall output to have driven the recovery
(Hadass and Williamson, 2003, p. 636).
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Figure 3.16: Argentina industrial output (1900=100)
Source: Barbero and Rocchi, 2003, p. 265, Table 9.2.
The debates surrounding tariffs and crises were in some ways similar in Argentina to
the debates in the United States, mainly regarding concerns about changes in interna-
tional prices during crisis periods (Rayes, 2018, p. 13). But infant industry arguments
did not play a role in these discussions in Argentina as they did in the United States.
Instead, protectionists in Argentina focused on the role of tariff revenues as benefiting
government finances, without framing their arguments in terms of promoting renewed
economic growth in general in the aftermath of the crisis. Overall, the case for tariff rate
changes in Argentina driving the recovery from the 1890 crisis is much less clear than for
the comparable (1890s) situation in the United States (and that connection in the U.S.
case is already hard to establish). Tariff rates fluctuated more erratically in Argentina,
and did not show a clear trend after the 1890 crisis, in contrast to the clear upward trend
in both tariff rates and economic output in the United States from 1897 onward. Tariffs
in the United States benefited agriculture as well as manufacturing, and were based at
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least in part on infant industry concerns, in contrast to the tariffs in Argentina which
were spread across a range of goods and were primarily intended to produce revenue for
the government. While primary products made up 99.7% of Argentinian exports in the
years before World War I, they only accounted for 73.3% of U.S. exports at that time
(Hadass and Williamson, 2003, p. 636). Protectionist policies that favored manufac-
turing would thus have a wider economic impact in the United States than they would
have in Argentina at this time, though the evidence for the U.S. case still suggests that
this effect on the recovery was not as great as the impact of rising commodity prices.
In the more diversified U.S. economy, manufacturing and agricultural interests could vie
for favorable tariff treatment. But the Argentinian economy was much more centered
around agriculture, so manufacturers were less able to influence protectionist policies
to their advantage compared to manufacturers in the United States. While wool man-
ufacturers pressured the U.S. Congress to change tariff rates in their favor, “Argentina
possessed virtually no economic production or services which were independent of, or
in conflict with, the dominant pastoral interests which controlled the state” (Denoon,
1983, p. 159). The political influence of agricultural interests meant that agricultural ex-
port price changes impacted the Argentinian economy more than did any moves toward
protectionism.
3.5 Conclusion
The recoveries from the major financial crises in the United States and Argentina
in the 1890s were driven more by rising commodity prices than by protectionist trade
policies. These countries thus are exceptions to the broader econometric results in
Chapter 2 above, which found that terms of trade shocks did not have a significant
impact on economic growth during post-crisis periods in temperate countries. Those
econometric findings are based on panel data that span the entire 1870-1913 period, and
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include a broader sample of diverse countries. More research needs to be done to see
how the experiences of Argentina and the United States during the 1890s differed from
crises in other decades and in other countries.31
The crises in Argentina and the United States in the last decade of the 19th cen-
tury were particularly severe. The Baring Crisis in Argentina dashed Europeans’ hope
of finding a “new America,” while the 1890s depression in the United States led to
the Republican presidential candidate being elected in 1896 and the implementing of
the strongest protectionist policies ever seen in that country. These crises also had
international repercussions in addition to the problems they caused domestically, by
destabilizing economies with which they shared trade and financial ties (Kindleberger
and Aliber, 2005, p. 119).
For both the United States and Argentina, low export prices coincided with the 1890s
depressions, and higher commodity prices then helped propel the subsequent recoveries
in those economies. The connection between tariff rate changes and these recoveries is
much less clear. Other economic and political issues were also influential, and future
research can build on this study by looking at related factors in more detail. For example,
it would be informative to measure the impacts that increased export revenue had on
investment and consumption patterns. Also, it would be useful to look in greater depth
at the international connections between these economies, and to construct an analysis
of this period focusing specifically on the effects that events in one country had in other
countries. Additionally, the importance of individual commodities can be quantified
with more precision to get a better understanding of these economies. Other political
31The terms of trade and GDP per capita data are averaged across the countries in this sample in
figure C.3 in the data appendix. The 1890s stand out for having an especially deep trough followed by a
sharp peak in the terms of trade data. Thus this period is unique and these findings are not necessarily
similar to lesser crises and lesser terms of trade movements in other periods.
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developments also need to be taken into account when looking at how certain policies
came into being.32
Agricultural price, production, and export data suggest that positive changes in com-
modity market conditions played more of a role in the recoveries from the 1890s crises in
the United States and Argentina than did any turn to protectionism in these countries.
In both countries, the 1890s depressions were set off by financial panics that were then
followed by unfavorable markets for their main exports. These economies then recovered
when commodity export prices increased. Tariff changes in the United States were not
connected to increased agricultural production, and U.S. exports began increasing in
the 1890s well before the move toward protectionism. Tariffs in Argentina were more
focused on generating government revenue than on supporting domestic industry, and
were not increasingly protectionist during this period. Governments played increasingly
prominent roles in supporting economic recoveries from subsequent crises in the twen-
tieth and twenty-first centuries, but the recoveries from the 1890s depressions in the
United States and Argentina were driven more by market conditions for agricultural
commodities than by changes in trade policies.
32The “free silver” movement in the United States is one example (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, pp.
113-19).
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APPENDIX A
GOVERNMENT-SUPPORTED INDUSTRIES AND
FINANCIAL CRISES, 1880-1913
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Table A.1: Control variables (based on Esteves and Jalles, 2016).
Variable Description Source
tot Exogenous terms of trade Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson (2007)
ca Trade account (in millions LCU) Mitchell (1998a, 1998b, 1998c); da Motta et
al. (1990); Wagner et al. (2000); INEGRI
(2009) and El Colégio de Mexico (1960); Pa-
muk (1995); Valéro (2001); Carreras and
Tafunel (2005)
pubdeffs Deficit/Revenue Accominotti et al. (2011); Wagner et al.
(2000); Kalmanovtz (2010); Japanese Sta-
tistical Association (1987); Tunçer (2011);
Statesman’s Yearbook; Mata (1993); Gnja-
tović (2009); Uruguayan Statistical Year-
books
gold =1 if on gold standard Accominotti et al. (2011); Meissner (2005)
fiscstrs Government debt service payments / govern-
mentt revenue
Accominotti et al. (2011); Ferguson & Schu-
larick (2006); Wagner et al. (2000); Sinópsis
Estadística (1918); Mitchell (1998a, 1998b,
1998c); Kalmanovtz (2010); Japanese Statis-
tical Association (1987); El Colégio de Mex-
ico (1960); Wilkie (1967); Pamuk (1987);
Güran (2003); Tantaléan Arbulú (1983); Gn-
jatović (2009); Bertino (1996, 2005); An-
uario Estadístico de la República Oriental del
Uruguay
popgrow Growth rate of popn (%) Clemens & Williamson (2004b)
urban Urbanization rate (100,000+) Clemens & Williamson (2004b)
school % of population <=14 years enrolled in pri-
mary education
Clemens & Williamson (2004b)
lagmigr 5-year lag of net migration index Clemens & Williamson (2004b)
ppexport % of primary products in exports Clemens & Williamson (2004b)
arabland Arable land Clemens and Williamson (2004); Esteves
(2007a)
chgtot 5-years lagged cumulative change in terms of
trade
Clemens and Williamson (2004)
war =1 if interstate war Clemens & Williamson (2004)
colony =0 if independent, =1 if colony, =2 if inter-
nally autonomous
Clemens & Williamson (2004b)
tariff Duties/imports Clemens & Williamson (2004b)
spread Sovereign spreads over British consols in ba-
sis points
Accominotti et al. (2011); Ferguson and
Schularick (2006); Esteves (2007b); Clemens
& Williamson (2004b)
gsbills 3 months market rates in London (in p.p.) Mitchell (1962)
gsconsols British consol yields (in p.p.) Accominotti et al. (2011); Homer and Sylla
(2005)
excr Real exchange rate Schneider et al. (1991); Accominotti et
al. (2011); Conde (1989); Global Finan-
cial Data; da Motta et al. (1990); Ocampo
(1984); MOxLAD Database; Japanese Sta-
tistical Association (1987); INEGI (2009);
Eitrheim et al. (2004); Esteves (2002); Sutch
and Carter (2006)
Notes: These variables are either entered directly in the regressions or are accounted for the in principal component
analysis.
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Table A.2: Dependent variables
Variable Description Source
startcrisis =1 if a country is in the first year of a de-
fault/currency/banking crisis
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009); Bordo and
Meissner (2007); Esteves (2007b); Suter
(1990)
bankcurr =1 if a country is experiencing a banking,
currency, or twin crisis
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) ; Bordo and
Meissner (2007)
Table A.3: Probit regressions (marginal effects)
Dependent variable:
Beginning of crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
K total 0.6693** 0.7719**
(0.3068) (0.3642)
K supported 0.9490* 0.7742 1.1714 0.8775
(0.5406) (0.5934) (0.7253) (0.7854)
K government 0.8049* 0.6319 0.8762* 0.7011
(0.4437) (0.4603) (0.4859) (0.5018)
K non-supported 1.0000 -0.5015 1.4088 0.0850
(2.3787) (2.6909) (2.6372) (2.8828)
Terms of trade 0.0005 0.0007 0.0005 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007 0.0008 0.0007 0.0009 0.0007
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Current account -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0012 -0.0010
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Deficit/revenue -0.0732 -0.0447 -0.0719 -0.0314 -0.0740 -0.0778 -0.0410 -0.0812 -0.0354 -0.0759
(0.0633) (0.0615) (0.0640) (0.0578) (0.0645) (0.0757) (0.0730) (0.0770) (0.0712) (0.0779)
Gold 0.0282 0.0221 0.0301 0.0212 0.0290 0.0504 0.0544 0.0470 0.0471 0.0521
(0.0315) (0.0312) (0.0318) (0.0313) (0.0318) (0.0440) (0.0446) (0.0439) (0.0443) (0.0444)
Consols -0.0796 -0.0808 -0.0674 -0.0590 -0.0830 -0.0811 -0.0857 -0.0686 -0.0596 -0.0843
(0.0596) (0.0606) (0.0590) (0.0591) (0.0606) (0.0642) (0.0652) (0.0638) (0.0634) (0.0659)
Fiscal stress -0.1477 -0.1512 -0.1233 -0.1166 -0.1493 0.0175 0.0356 0.0196 0.0577 0.0159
(0.1387) (0.1405) (0.1379) (0.1390) (0.1394) (0.2635) (0.2597) (0.2651) (0.2603) (0.2636)
N 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403
Country FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No No No No No No No
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Independent variables are lagged one period. Constant term
is included in the regressions but omitted from the table for brevity.
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Table A.4: Probit regressions with additional explanatory variables (marginal effects)
Dependent variable:
Beginning of crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
K total 0.7548**
(0.3402)
K supported 1.1265* 0.9469
(0.6012) (0.6441)
K government 0.8153* 0.6324
(0.4769) (0.4884)
K non-supported 1.6253 -0.0262
(2.6900) (2.9272)
Population growth -0.0002 0.0003 0.0077 0.0114 -0.0022
(0.0200) (0.0203) (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0204)
Schooling 0.1394 0.1250 0.1238 0.0969 0.1422
(0.1243) (0.1243) (0.1243) (0.1245) (0.1245)
Exports p.c. 0.0266 -0.0234 0.0500 -0.0244 0.0269
(0.2509) (0.2523) (0.2551) (0.2551) (0.2559)
Arable land 0.0657 0.0531 0.0617 0.0468 0.0647
(0.0482) (0.0471) (0.0481) (0.0464) (0.0484)
Terms of trade 0.0007 0.0009 0.0007 0.0009 0.0007
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011)
Current account -0.0013* -0.0014* -0.0014* -0.0014* -0.0013*
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Deficit/revenue -0.1134 -0.0783 -0.1142 -0.0693 -0.1099
(0.0717) (0.0703) (0.0740) (0.0700) (0.0744)
Colony -0.0253 -0.0247 -0.0199 -0.0231 -0.0247
(0.0297) (0.0299) (0.0295) (0.0305) (0.0305)
Gold 0.0224 0.0125 0.0200 0.0053 0.0227
(0.0430) (0.0425) (0.0433) (0.0424) (0.0434)
Tariff -0.0027 -0.0020 -0.0026 -0.0019 -0.0026
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0028)
Spread 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Consols -0.0682 -0.0707 -0.0554 -0.0425 -0.0730
(0.0654) (0.0663) (0.0651) (0.0650) (0.0668)
Real exch. rate -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0003
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0019)
Fiscal stress -0.0507 -0.0596 -0.0409 -0.0360 -0.0554
(0.1614) (0.1625) (0.1618) (0.1623) (0.1621)
N 387 387 387 387 387
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Independent variables are lagged one period. Constant term is included in the
regressions but omitted from the table for brevity.
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Table A.5: Linear regressions with banking/currency/twin crisis as independent variable
Dependent variable:
Banking/currency/twin crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
K total 0.4025** 0.4640*
(0.1943) (0.2616)
K supported 1.3924** 1.4582** 2.0790*** 2.3680***
(0.6813) (0.7316) (0.6022) (0.7079)
K government 0.1522 -0.0671 0.0043 -0.2457
(0.1384) (0.3384) (0.2409) (0.2938)
K non-supported -1.0803 -2.2215 -1.4608 -3.3222
(1.6333) (1.3688) (2.9614) (2.9475)
Default 0.8172*** 0.7973*** 0.8573*** 0.8589*** 0.8451*** 0.7668*** 0.7262*** 0.7909*** 0.8156*** 0.7757*** 0.8309*** 0.8187***
(0.0539) (0.0700) (0.0480) (0.0479) (0.0744) (0.1083) (0.0965) (0.1016) (0.0719) (0.0734) (0.0487) (0.1033)
Terms of trade 0.0008 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0009 0.0011* 0.0011** 0.0011* 0.0012* 0.0012** 0.0007 0.0011*
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Current account -0.0024 -0.0019 -0.0017 -0.0027 -0.0015 -0.0065*** -0.0063*** -0.0068*** -0.0070*** -0.0066*** -0.0026 -0.0060***
(0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0024) (0.0016)
Deficit/revenue -0.0168 -0.0138 -0.0108 -0.0142 -0.0114 -0.0175 -0.0153 -0.0155 -0.0165 -0.0163 -0.0156 -0.0196
(0.0137) (0.0140) (0.0126) (0.0123) (0.0140) (0.0163) (0.0158) (0.0162) (0.0161) (0.0166) (0.0117) (0.0160)
Gold -0.0186 -0.0285 -0.0339 -0.0171 -0.0366 0.0333 0.0380 0.0353 0.0368 0.0429 -0.0306 0.0028
(0.0466) (0.0480) (0.0445) (0.0460) (0.0461) (0.0558) (0.0563) (0.0575) (0.0570) (0.0563) (0.0483) (0.0673)
Consols -0.0271 -0.0403 -0.0126 -0.0212 -0.0430 0.0066 -0.0098 -0.0032 -0.0018 -0.0137 -0.0122 0.0163
(0.0928) (0.0973) (0.0883) (0.0929) (0.0987) (0.3412) (0.3510) (0.3408) (0.3369) (0.3552) (0.0874) (0.2854)
Fiscal stress -0.0289 -0.0809 -0.0684 -0.0064 -0.1177 0.6570 0.6641 0.6657 0.6853 0.7089* 0.0309 0.3633
(0.1876) (0.1886) (0.1959) (0.1978) (0.1965) (0.4193) (0.4237) (0.4322) (0.4222) (0.4225) (0.1485) (0.2582)
N 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 342 342
Notes: Column 12 includes country and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables are lagged one period. Constant term is included in the regressions but
omitted from the table for brevity. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A.6: Linear regressions with banking/currency/twin crisis as independent variable
Dependent variable:
Banking/currency/twin crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
K total 0.6726* 0.7140*
(0.3768) (0.4309)
K supported 1.9033** 1.8103** 2.6621*** 2.7091***
(0.8656) (0.9046) (0.8708) (0.8941)
K government 0.2046 -0.0933 0.0805 -0.2574
(0.2304) (0.3092) (0.3157) (0.2302)
K non-supported 3.1656 1.3757 2.8158 0.4384
(2.7086) (2.3644) (2.5053) (1.5495)
Terms of trade 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0006 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Current account -0.0020 -0.0016 -0.0023 -0.0022 -0.0014 -0.0072*** -0.0070*** -0.0077*** -0.0074*** -0.0070***
(0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0014)
Deficit/revenue -0.0188 -0.0150 -0.0153 -0.0133 -0.0132 -0.0277 -0.0239 -0.0255 -0.0226 -0.0222
(0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0141) (0.0172) (0.0166) (0.0170) (0.0161) (0.0170)
Gold -0.0398 -0.0494 -0.0399 -0.0450 -0.0557 0.0243 0.0313 0.0267 0.0245 0.0320
(0.0466) (0.0498) (0.0458) (0.0475) (0.0510) (0.0516) (0.0529) (0.0542) (0.0549) (0.0539)
Consols -0.0395 -0.0558 -0.0256 -0.0133 -0.0475 0.0783 0.0507 0.0684 0.0593 0.0429
(0.1007) (0.1039) (0.0958) (0.0903) (0.0972) (0.3431) (0.3588) (0.3375) (0.3389) (0.3629)
Fiscal stress 0.0191 -0.0285 0.0591 0.0609 -0.0372 0.9264** 0.9211** 0.9529** 0.8984** 0.9135**
(0.2158) (0.2131) (0.2227) (0.2146) (0.2124) (0.4020) (0.4184) (0.4065) (0.4212) (0.4340)
N 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables are lagged one period. Constant term is included in the regressions but omitted from the
table for brevity. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Principal component analysis
I follow Esteves and Jalles (2016) in grouping the variables into several categories
before extracting the components (with eigenvalues above one) to use in the empirical
analyses.
These categories are: international competitiveness (ic); investment climate and
monetary stability (icms); long-run macroeconomic prospects (lrmp); and political sta-
bility (ps). Gold standard membership is used as a measure of financial development
(fd).
• “International competitiveness” (ic) captures information such as imports, exports,
current account balance, tariffs, and terms of trade.
• “Investment climate and monetary stability” (icms) captures inflation, debt service
over government revenue, and per capita exports.
• “Long-run macroeconomic prospects” (lrmp) includes data on primary school en-
rollment rates, urbanization, arable land, migration, distance from London, and
population growth.
• “Political stability” (ps) has four variables for internal and external wars and
disputes.
• “Financial development” (fd) is gold standard membership.
One principal component was retained for the international competitiveness, invest-
ment climate and monetary stability, and political stability categories. Two principal
components were retained for the long-run macroeconomic prospects category. Addition-
ally, to account for the global supply of capital, the yields on British consols (gsconsols)
and the three-month bills rate in London (gsbills) are used, along with the real ex-
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change rate (excr), again following Esteves and Jalles (2016). The factor loadings and
uniqueness for each variable are presented in table A.7.
Table A.7: Factor loadings and uniqueness
Variable Factors Uniqueness
ic1 icms1 lmp1 lmp2 ps1
Terms of trade 0.0730 0.9731
Exports 0.9786 0.0412
Imports 0.9826 0.0345
Tariff -0.2637 0.9039
Debt service /rev. 0.1944 0.9622
Exports p.c. 0.2722 0.9259
Inflation -0.2129 0.9547
Arable land 0.2739 -0.0268 0.9030
Distance to London 0.7598 -0.3568 0.2952
Lagged migration 0.8569 0.0189 0.2628
Pop. growth 0.5518 0.2638 0.6249
School -0.1527 0.5411 0.6837
Urbanization 0.4411 0.4517 0.6008
Extrastate war 0.0233 0.9895
Interstate war 0.4993 0.7505
Interstate dispute 0.5314 0.7175
Intrastate war 0.2603 0.9298
% explained 0.53 0.38 0.40 0.23 0.37
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Table A.8: Linear regressions with principal components
Dependent variable:
Beginning of crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
K total 0.7930** 0.6049
(0.3928) (0.6386)
K supported 1.2791** 1.2175* 1.8986*** 1.9132**
(0.5971) (0.6266) (0.7317) (0.7516)
K government 0.7960 0.6976 0.2222 0.1007
(0.5204) (0.4756) (0.6802) (0.6353)
K non-supported 0.0725 -1.1763 0.7142 -0.5083
(1.6537) (1.6973) (2.5317) (2.2712)
ic1 0.0196** 0.0178** 0.0187** 0.0172** 0.0182** 0.0749** 0.0745** 0.0827*** 0.0862*** 0.0727**
(0.0078) (0.0077) (0.0080) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0337) (0.0348) (0.0313) (0.0300) (0.0350)
icms1 -0.0059 -0.0069 -0.0025 -0.0017 -0.0069 0.0228 0.0270 0.0272 0.0294 0.0260
(0.0172) (0.0160) (0.0174) (0.0171) (0.0165) (0.0463) (0.0408) (0.0478) (0.0437) (0.0448)
fd1 0.0197 0.0144 0.0249 0.0207 0.0200 0.0767* 0.0784* 0.0817** 0.0831** 0.0778*
(0.0385) (0.0395) (0.0397) (0.0398) (0.0401) (0.0439) (0.0409) (0.0415) (0.0408) (0.0422)
lrmp1 0.0037 0.0023 0.0059 0.0053 0.0034 0.0830 0.0944 0.0831 0.0840 0.0942
(0.0084) (0.0082) (0.0071) (0.0064) (0.0089) (0.1007) (0.1035) (0.1029) (0.1004) (0.1050)
lrmp2 0.0139 0.0143 0.0112 0.0103 0.0148 0.0266 0.0219 0.0291 0.0267 0.0234
(0.0123) (0.0128) (0.0131) (0.0136) (0.0132) (0.1313) (0.1365) (0.1281) (0.1328) (0.1392)
ps1 -0.0136 -0.0134 -0.0143 -0.0144 -0.0135 0.0061 0.0068 0.0059 0.0058 0.0069
(0.0115) (0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0122) (0.0116) (0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0123)
gsconsols -0.1570** -0.1584*** -0.1450** -0.1371** -0.1654*** -0.6398 -0.6546 -0.6620 -0.6760 -0.6475
(0.0629) (0.0596) (0.0625) (0.0599) (0.0635) (0.5096) (0.5091) (0.5061) (0.4992) (0.5119)
gsbills 0.0554*** 0.0553*** 0.0553*** 0.0552*** 0.0554*** -0.0822 -0.1115 -0.0707 -0.0692 -0.1129
(0.0166) (0.0160) (0.0167) (0.0161) (0.0167) (0.2619) (0.2661) (0.2623) (0.2587) (0.2666)
excr -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0005
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0007)
N 349 349 349 349 349 349 349 349 349 349
Country FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables are lagged one period. Constant term is included in the regressions but omitted
from the table for brevity. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A.9: Linear regressions with panel-corrected standard errors
Dependent variable:
Beginning of crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
K total 0.7406**
(0.3057)
K supported 1.3145** 1.1572*
(0.6254) (0.6406)
K government 0.7299** 0.5016
(0.3624) (0.3573)
K non-supported 1.2511 -0.3007
(2.3114) (2.3421)
Lagged dep. variable -0.1041 -0.1122* -0.0976 -0.1016 -0.1083
(0.0664) (0.0664) (0.0669) (0.0666) (0.0668)
Terms of trade 0.0006 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Current account -0.0010** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** -0.0010**
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Deficit/revenue -0.0214 -0.0174 -0.0197 -0.0144 -0.0207
(0.0269) (0.0270) (0.0270) (0.0268) (0.0272)
Gold 0.0285 0.0229 0.0301 0.0230 0.0274
(0.0215) (0.0210) (0.0217) (0.0211) (0.0211)
Consols -0.0758 -0.0804 -0.0638 -0.0541 -0.0832
(0.0804) (0.0814) (0.0804) (0.0816) (0.0826)
Fiscal stress -0.1826 -0.1876 -0.1516 -0.1395 -0.1914
(0.1250) (0.1322) (0.1186) (0.1212) (0.1302)
N 403 403 403 403 403
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables are lagged one period. Con-
stant term is included in the regressions but omitted from the table for brevity. * p<0.10,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A.10: System GMM
Dependent variable:
Cumulative crises (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
K total 8.7508***
(2.6826)
K supported 13.8055** 14.1978*
(6.2628) (8.4895)
K government 9.8197*** 3.5479
(2.9318) (5.4213)
K non-supported 21.6055 -36.6198
(35.2569) (37.9547)
Lagged dep. variable 0.7741*** 0.7878*** 0.7855*** 0.8532*** 0.7559***
(0.0967) (0.0964) (0.1151) (0.1020) (0.1184)
Terms of trade 0.0105 0.0072 0.0114 0.0019 0.0071
(0.0093) (0.0087) (0.0084) (0.0069) (0.0079)
Current account -0.0029 -0.0033 -0.0029 -0.0032 -0.0040
(0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0032)
Deficit/revenue -0.1221 -0.0201 -0.0964 0.1196 -0.0904
(0.4159) (0.3354) (0.4137) (0.3874) (0.3620)
Gold -0.2685 -0.2659 -0.2166 -0.1220 -0.3673
(0.2360) (0.2453) (0.2618) (0.3026) (0.2567)
Consols -1.3120 -1.2467 -0.6326 0.2573 -0.7340
(0.8659) (0.8920) (0.9927) (1.2713) (1.0387)
Fiscal stress -0.8935 -0.2963 -0.2895 0.4634 0.2022
(1.8895) (1.8651) (1.8971) (2.0173) (2.0167)
N 92 92 92 92 92
Groups 15 15 15 15 15
Instruments 31 31 31 31 37
Arello-Bond test 0.050 0.046 0.013 0.030 0.032
for second-order
autocorrelation (p-value)
Hansen test 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(p-value)
Notes: Year dummies and constant terms included in regressions but omitted from table.
Control variables treated as endogenous and instrumented using 2nd and 3rd lags. Wind-
meijer corrected standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A.11: Linear regressions (USA dropped)
Dependent variable:
Beginning of crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
K total 0.7102*** 0.9060***
(0.2237) (0.3057)
K supported 1.1567*** 0.9867*** 1.7032*** 1.4608***
(0.3531) (0.3299) (0.3858) (0.3262)
K government 0.7572** 0.5706** 0.7999** 0.6145**
(0.3042) (0.2420) (0.3303) (0.2536)
K non-supported 1.0445 -0.3625 2.2149 0.6947
(1.8749) (1.6994) (2.9665) (2.5527)
Terms of trade 0.0009 0.0010 0.0009 0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0011 0.0010 0.0011 0.0011
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Current account -0.0020** -0.0021*** -0.0021** -0.0022** -0.0020** -0.0018 -0.0019 -0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0017
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0019)
Deficit/revenue -0.0175 -0.0134 -0.0163 -0.0108 -0.0172 -0.0067 -0.0022 -0.0073 -0.0016 -0.0050
(0.0121) (0.0090) (0.0120) (0.0090) (0.0120) (0.0129) (0.0141) (0.0129) (0.0147) (0.0138)
Gold 0.0234 0.0183 0.0253 0.0179 0.0235 0.0610 0.0671 0.0627 0.0651 0.0632
(0.0255) (0.0253) (0.0259) (0.0253) (0.0252) (0.0480) (0.0478) (0.0471) (0.0476) (0.0483)
Consols -0.0874 -0.0905* -0.0762 -0.0661 -0.0939* -0.0986 -0.1284 -0.0893 -0.1206 -0.1110
(0.0547) (0.0531) (0.0522) (0.0498) (0.0526) (0.1054) (0.1083) (0.0991) (0.0952) (0.1175)
Fiscal stress -0.1747 -0.1766 -0.1478 -0.1351 -0.1807 -0.0557 -0.0531 -0.0277 -0.0683 -0.0600
(0.1124) (0.1197) (0.1084) (0.1097) (0.1170) (0.2855) (0.3034) (0.2809) (0.3038) (0.3274)
N 373 373 373 373 373 373 373 373 373 373
Country FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables are lagged one period. Constant term is included in the regressions but omitted
from the table for brevity. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table A.12: Linear regressions (Fiscal stress dropped)
Dependent variable:
Beginning of crisis (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
K total 0.6861*** 0.8396***
(0.2101) (0.3221)
K supported 1.2417*** 1.1095*** 1.6865*** 1.4589***
(0.3134) (0.3507) (0.3898) (0.3941)
K government 0.6845** 0.4505 0.7048* 0.4953
(0.3344) (0.3200) (0.3897) (0.3383)
K non-supported 0.8598 -0.5885 2.2475 0.7715
(1.8605) (1.7912) (2.2776) (1.8687)
Terms of trade 0.0006 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0010 0.0011 0.0010 0.0011 0.0011
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Current account -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0008* -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0009
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007)
Deficit/revenue -0.0243 -0.0206 -0.0223 -0.0171 -0.0237 -0.0098 -0.0053 -0.0096 -0.0045 -0.0078
(0.0169) (0.0133) (0.0157) (0.0116) (0.0163) (0.0119) (0.0122) (0.0115) (0.0126) (0.0115)
Gold 0.0316 0.0267 0.0332 0.0270 0.0309 0.0544 0.0596 0.0564 0.0578 0.0564
(0.0257) (0.0258) (0.0257) (0.0254) (0.0259) (0.0477) (0.0476) (0.0475) (0.0481) (0.0480)
Consols -0.0614 -0.0652 -0.0532 -0.0467 -0.0677 -0.3120 -0.3367 -0.3088 -0.3264 -0.3240
(0.0524) (0.0516) (0.0516) (0.0505) (0.0527) (0.2614) (0.2582) (0.2598) (0.2595) (0.2604)
N 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424 424
Country FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables are lagged one period. Constant term is included in the regressions but
omitted from the table for brevity. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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French data appendix
The newly compiled French data from Esteves (2015) contain several sets of mea-
surements of capital exports from France. One of these series is “basic” and the other
is “maximalist.” Both of these series include data that have been newly compiled by
Esteves, expanding the data on French capital calls from the Commission de Valeurs
Mobilières (CVM) (Esteves, 2011). The “basic” series is the more conservative measure-
ment, accounting for securities which were recorded as being bought by French investors
and sold in France (and for which there is a recorded price) (Figure A.1). The “maximal-
ist” series includes securities for which there was a price recorded, but not necessarily a
clear reference as to whether the issue was placed in France (Figure A.2). Thus the basic
series is the more conservative measure of French capital exports. The main empirical
analyses above employ the basic series, but the same regressions are run with the maxi-
malist series as robustness checks, and the results are essentially the same. Both of these
series build on Esteves (2011) by including measures of French capital exports to govern-
ments, in addition to the various private sector categories. This additional data makes a
significant contribution by allowing for a more complete analysis of turn-of-the-century
capital exports, beyond the British data relied upon in earlier studies.
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Figure A.1: Total French capital exports (“basic” series), 1880-1913.
Figure A.2: Total French capital exports (“maximalist” series), 1880-1913.
133
APPENDIX B
RECOVERY FROM FINANCIAL CRISES IN PERIPHERAL
ECONOMIES, 1870-1913
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Table B.1: Countries and crises, 1880-1913
Country Default Currency Crisis Banking Crisis
Argentina 1890-93 1885, 1890, 1908 1885, 1890-91
Australia 1893
Austria 1873
Brazil 1898 1889, 1898 1890-92, 1897-98, 1900-01
Canada 1891, 1893, 1908 1906, 1908, 1912
Ceylon 1894
Chile 1880-83 1887, 1889, 1898 1898, 1907
China 1892-93, 1901 1883
Colombia 1880-96, 1900-04 1906, 1909
Cuba 1898
Denmark 1885, 1902, 1907
Egypt 1900 1907
France 1888 1882, 1889, 1904, 1907
Germany 1893, 1907 1880, 1891, 1901
Greece 1894-97 1885
India 1894 1908
Italy 1894, 1908 1887, 1891, 1893, 1907
Japan 1900, 1904, 1908 1882-85, 1901, 1907
Mexico 1880-85 1883, 1893, 1908, 1913
New Zealand 1903
Norway 1898
Peru 1880-89 1893
Portugal 1892-1901 1891 1890-91
Russia 1891 1896
Serbia 1895
Spain
Sweden 1897, 1907
Turkey 1880-81 1886, 1903
Uruguay 1891 1893, 1898
United States 1891 1884, 1890, 1907
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b); Bordo and Meissner (2007); Esteves (2007b); Suter
(1990).
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Figure B.1: Temperate vs. tropical countries: data averages
(a) Temperate: terms of trade (b) Temperate: tariff
(c) Tropical: terms of trade (d) Tropical: tariff
Notes: The graphs show the average terms of trade and tariff measures across the tem-
perate and tropical sub-samples of countries respectively, from 1870-1913. The temper-
ate countries include those in the European periphery, regions of recent settlement, and
the Southern Cone countries of South America: Argentina, Australia, Austria-Hungary,
Canada, Chile, Denmark, Greece, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Ser-
bia, Spain, Sweden, United States, Uruguay. The rest of the countries in the sample
are classified as tropical: Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India,
Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey.
Sources: Tariff data are from Clemens and Williamson (2004b) and terms of trade data
are from Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson (2007).
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Figure B.2: Response of real GDP to terms of trade and tariff shocks, over the ten years
following the onset of a financial crisis
(a) Terms of trade (b) Tariff
Note: The graphs show the impulse response function of real GDP to an impulse of
terms of trade or tariff shocks (as specified in each graph) from estimating equation 1,
along with 95 percent confidence bands.
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Figure B.3: Response of real GDP to terms of trade and tariff shocks, after the onset of
specific types of financial crises
(a) Banking crisis: terms of trade (b) Banking crisis: tariff
(c) Currency crisis: terms of trade (d) Currency crisis: tariff
(e) Default: terms of trade (f) Default: tariff
Note: The graphs show the impulse response function of real GDP to an impulse of
terms of trade and tariffs from estimating equation 1, along with 95 percent confidence
bands, after the start of banking crises, currency crises, or sovereign defaults.
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Figure B.4: Response of capital inflows to terms of trade and tariff shocks
(a) Terms of trade (b) Tariff
Notes: The graphs show the impulse response function of capital inflows to an impulse of
terms of trade and tariffs from estimating equation 1, along with 95 percent confidence
bands.
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APPENDIX C
TERMS OF TRADE, TARIFF RATES, AND RECOVERIES
FROM FINANCIAL CRISES: THE UNITED STATES AND
ARGENTINA IN THE 1890S
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Table C.1: U.S. Ports by Region
Region Port
Atlantic Alexandria, VA Aroostook, ME Baltimore, MD
Bangor, ME Barnstable, MA Bath, ME
Beaufort, SC Belfast, ME Boston and Charleston, MA
Bridgeton, NJ Bristol and Warren, RI Brunswick, GA
Castnie, ME Charleston, SC Delaware
Edgartown, MA Fairfield, CT Fall River, MA
Fernandina, FL Frenchman Bay, ME Georgetown, DC
Georgetown, SC Glouster, MA Great Egg Harbor, NJ
Hartford, CT Machias, ME Marblehead, MA
Newark, NJ New Bedford, MA Newburyport, MA
New Haven, CT New London, CT Newport, RI
Newport News, VA New York, NY Norfolk and Portsmouth, VA
Pamlico, NC Passamaquoddy, ME Perth Amboy, NJ
Petersburg, VA Philadelphia, PA Plymouth, MA
Portland and Falmouth, ME Portsmouth, NH Providence, RI
Richmond, VA Saco, MA St. Augustine, FL
St. Johns, FL St. Marys, GA Salem and Beverly, MA
Savannah, GA Stonington, CT Waldoboro, ME
Wilmington, NC Wiacasset, ME
Gulf Apalachicola, FL Brazos de Santiago, TX Corpus Christi, TX
Galveston, TX Key West, TX Mobile, AL
New Orleans, LA Paso del Norte, TX Pearl River, MS
Pensacola, FL St. Marks, FL Saluria, TX
Tampa, FL Teche, LA
Pacific Alaska Arizona Humboldt, CA
Los Angeles, CA Oregon Puget Sound, WA
San Diego, CA San Francisco, CA Southern Oregon
Willamette, OR
Northern Buffalo Creek, NY Cape Vincent, NY Champlain, NY
Chicago, IL Cuyahoga, OH Detroit, MI
Duluth, MN Dunkirk, NY Erie, PA
Genesee, NY Huron, MI Miami, OH
Michigan Milwaukee, WI Minnesota
Montana and Idaho Niagra, NY North and South Dakota
Oswedo, NY Sandusky, OH Superior, MI
Vermont
Interior Albany, NY Atlanta, GA Cincinnati, OH
Columbus, OH Council Bluffs, IA Denver, CO
Des Moines, IA Dubuque, IA Evansville, IN
Kansas City, MO Lincoln, NE Louisville, KY
Memphis, TN Nashville, TN Omaha, NE
Pittsburgh, PA St. Joseph, MO St. Joseph, MO
St. Louis, MO Sioux City, IA Springfield, MA
Syracuse, NY
Sources: Summary Statement of the Imports and Exports of the United States and Monthly Summary of Foreign
Commerce of the United States.
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Table C.2: U.S. Workers, Agricultural vs. Nonagricultural, by State, 1900
State Ag. workers Nonag. workers % workers in ag.
(00 omitted) (00 omitted)
Alabama 5435 2196 71
Arizona 176 357 33
Arkansas 3626 1232 75
California 1615 4827 25
Colorado 487 1696 22
Connecticut 491 3365 13
Delaware 219 511 30
D.C. 17 1252 1
Florida 913 1103 45
Georgia 5573 3071 64
Idaho 298 329 48
Illinois 5170 12870 29
Indiana 3850 5139 43
Iowa 4032 3862 51
Kansas 2913 2164 57
Kentucky 4425 3101 59
Louisiana 3295 2066 61
Maine 851 1917 31
Maryland 1087 3501 24
Massachusetts 715 11369 6
Michigan 3453 5606 38
Minnesota 2807 3652 43
Mississippi 5164 1288 80
Missouri 5017 6197 45
Montana 311 837 27
Nebraska 2014 1726 54
Nevada 66 132 33
New Hampshire 417 1370 23
New Jersey 770 6807 10
New Mexico 349 311 53
New York 4136 25828 14
North Carolina 4936 2231 69
North Dakota 765 412 65
Ohio 4665 10794 30
Oklahoma 1979 685 74
Oregon 642 1054 38
Pennsylvania 3896 20590 16
Rhode Island 118 1802 6
South Carolina 4195 1517 73
South Dakota 873 499 64
Tennessee 4495 2781 62
Texas 6960 3370 67
Utah 330 516 39
Vermont 541 808 40
Virgina 3359 3265 51
Washington 605 1649 27
West Virgina 1689 1568 52
Wisconsin 2986 4339 40
Wyoming 155 288 35
United States Total 112880 177852 39
Source: Lee et al. (1957, Table L-4, pp. 609-21) based on Census data.
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Figure C.1: Financial crises, 1870-1913
Note: See table B.1 for a list of the countries and crises in this sample.
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b); Bordo and Meissner (2007); Esteves (2007b); Suter
(1990).
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Figure C.2: Tariff and terms of trade data – regions of recent settlement
(a) Tariff (b) Terms of trade
Note: The countries in this subsample include Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, New
Zealand, the United States, and Uruguay. Excluding Argentina and the United States
from this group, for the sake of comparison, does not affect the overall trends.
Sources: Tariff data are from Clemens and Williamson (2004), terms of trade data are
from Blattman, Hwang, and Williamson (2007).
144
Figure C.3: Terms of trade and GDP per capita for 30 peripheral economies, 1870-1913
Note: Excluded from this subsample are the countries of the European core and countries that
did not experience a financial crisis over this period.
Source: Clemens and Williamson (2004).
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